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5“We shall never cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.”
--T.S. Eliot1
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1966, § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
Act of 19662 has been the subject of considerable debate within the transportation and 
environmental communities.  Section 4(f) was enacted during a time of growing 
awareness and concern on the part of the public and its elected representatives in 
preserving the environment and important historic sites from encroachment by and 
possible destruction due to the growth of the transportation system.3  It declared that 
"[i]t is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made 
to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, 
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites."4  The section goes on to note that 
transportation programs and projects that require the use of protected lands shall not 
be approved unless "(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; 
and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm" to 
1
 Quotes of T.S. Eliot, The Quotations Page, available at
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?Author-T.+S.+Eliot&file=other (last visited Aug. 8, 
2004).
2
 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
3 See e.g., Highway Existence: -- 100 Years and Beyond: A Peaceful Campaign of Progress and 
Reform: The Federal Highway Administration at 100, available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/rw93.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter FHWA 
History].
449 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2004).  Note--for simplicity, this paper will generically refer to these types of 
lands as "protected" lands.
6these types of lands.5  Although there is little continuing debate as to the virtues of the 
broad policy set forth by § 4(f), there has been much disagreement and discussion 
within the affected legal and policy communities as to the exact meaning, application, 
and reach of this important provision of law.6
Section 4(f) has also produced a considerable body of case law as the court 
system has wrestled with many of the same issues debated within the environmental 
and transportation policy communities, including the law's scope and application.7
This section also spawned the seminal administrative law case of Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe8 -- a case that is still viewed as a touchstone for the 
interpretation of federal administrative law and environmental and transportation law 
and policy9.  While the interpretations rendered by the judicial system have not, as of 
yet, translated into changes to the original statutory and regulatory scheme of § 4(f), 
several legislative proposals are currently pending that would do precisely that--
change the scope and application of § 4(f).10
The case law and policy debates on § 4(f) over the years have posed or raised 
a number of questions and issues.  For example: Why would such a seemingly 
beneficial policy of preventing harm to some of the nation's most important lands, 
properties and resources be the subject of such intense debate?  And, if changes were 
5
 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1,2).
6 See e.g., infra Part V. 
7 See e.g., infra Part III.
8
 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9See e.g., JERRY MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM CASES 
AND MATERIALS (1992) at 708-718.
10 See infra Part V.
7to be made to § 4(f), what impacts would be created?  What should the law be as to 
the protection of environmental resources and historic properties when confronted 
with the challenges of a growing population and an expanding highway and road 
network designed to help accommodate this growing population?  These are the 
questions that have been asked, debated and discussed for nearly forty years.  On the 
eve of the first substantial change to § 4(f) via the transportation reauthorization bill11
that is currently winding its way through Congress, it is important to review these 
questions and seek answers that might help guide the transportation and 
environmental communities through the next forty years of § 4(f)'s existence.
This discussion seeks to provide those answers to these questions.  Part II 
begins with a review of the history of § 4(f), examining the past in order to illuminate 
a future path or paths.  The discussion then turns to an analysis of the judicial, 
administrative and legislative interpretations of § 4(f).  Part III focuses on the 
differing interpretations taken by the Supreme Court and certain federal courts of 
appeals.  Part IV reviews actions and interpretations taken by the DOT, as well as 
recent Bush administration actions concerning § 4(f).  Following this line of inquiry, 
the discussion next proceeds in Part V with an analysis of key legislative proposals of 
the two most recent Congresses that have been offered in response to, or because of, 
the complex and occasionally controversial history that enshrouds this section of the 
11 See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2004, S. 1072, 108th
Cong. (2003); Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, H.R. 3550, 108th Cong. (2003).  These 
bills provide for the multi-year authorization of federal highway and transit programs and projects.  
They are also the main legislative vehicles for the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for 
the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. 105-178 (1998), the programs of which expired on September 30
2004.  TEA-21 has been extended six times by Congress, and the current extension expires on May 31, 
2004.  See Surface Transportation Extension Act, Part V, H.R. 5183, 108th Cong. (2004).  This 
combined legislative process is commonly known as the transportation bill reauthorization and/or 
TEA-21 reauthorization.
8law.  Finally, the discussion concludes in Part VI with an examination of the 
possibilities for the future of § 4(f).
II. FROM WHERE WE STARTED -- THE HISTORY OF § 4(f)
What today is commonly known operationally and in practice as "§ 4(f)"12 is 
the result of several evolutionary legislative developments.  Section 4(f) "represented 
the first major legislative victory, apart from water resource development programs, 
in the battle of conservationists for control of pubic works projects."13  This victory, 
however, was not absolute and not without its critics as the case law and subsequent 
legislative developments discussed below will note.
A. Federal- Aid Highway Act of 1966 -- "Consideration of Alternatives"
The opening move in the development of what has become known as § 4(f) 
originated with an amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 196614 offered by 
Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-TX).15  This amendment was offered largely in 
response to a proposal by the Texas Department of Highways to build a road through 
the Brackenridge Park in San Antonio and was an effort to place limitations on state 
12 See e.g.,The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, Section-
by- Section Analysis, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reauthorization/safetea__analysis.pdf (last 
viewed Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SAFETA DOT Analysis].  “Former § 4(f) was originally enacted as 
part of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and is now codified at 49 U.S.C. 303, but is still 
commonly referred to as “§ 4(f)”.  Id. at 26.
13
 Oscar S. Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 32 MD. L. REV. 327 (1973).
14
 This bill has been codified at 23 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2004).  See also Pub. L. No. 89-574.
15 Id. at 333-34.  Senator Yarborough served on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee.  See
Biography of Senator Ralph Webster Yarborough, available at
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=Y000006 (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
9departments of transportation when building highways that required the taking of 
parklands.16  This amendment ultimately was approved by the Senate and 
incorporated with a modification into the final conference report for the Federal-Aid 
Highways Act of 1966.17  The text of the provision as included in the conference 
report is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the 
provisions of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve 
Federal, State, and local government parklands and historic sites and the 
beauty and historic value of such lands and sites.  The Secretary shall 
cooperate with the States in developing highway plans and programs which 
carry out such policy.  After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve 
under § 105 of this title any program for a project which requires the use for 
such project of any land from a Federal, State, or local government park or 
historic site unless such program includes all possible planning, including 
consideration of alternatives to the use of such land to minimize any harm to 
such park or site resulting from such use.18
This final conference report language, now codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138, 
incorporated one significant change from the original Yarborough amendment 
approved by the Senate.  Senator Yarborough's amendment originally included a 
requirement that the Secretary of Transportation not approve any project using a 
protected land unless there was no "feasible alternative to the use of such land."19  As 
can be seen in the above conference report language, this language was deleted, and 
language requiring a "consideration of alternatives" was added instead.20  Explanatory 
16 Id.
17 Id. at 335.  See also CONFERENCE REPORT ON FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, H. RPT. NO. 
1903, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Conference Report]
18 Id.  This language was subsequently codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138.
19
 See Gray, supra note 13, at 334 citing 112 CONG. REC. 17448 (1966).
20 Id. at 335.  See also 1966 Conference Report, supra note 17.
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conference report language specifically noted that "[t]he requirement that there be no 
feasible alternative to the use of the land for highway purposes has been deleted and 
there has been added the requirement that the planning must include consideration of 
alternatives to the use of this land for highway purposes."21
B. Department of Transportation Act of 1966 -- "Feasible and Prudent 
Alternatives"
Concurrent with congressional consideration and passage of the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1966, Congress also considered legislation to create and establish the 
DOT.22  This legislation consolidated, for the first time, the major transportation 
modal administrations and agencies responsible for aviation, highways, railroads, 
motor carrier safety, the Coast Guard, and the Saint Lawrence Seaway.23  In creating 
this new cabinet-level department, Congress sought to not only establish the formal 
structures that would govern the day-to-day operations of the department and its new 
constituent administrations, but also to outline broad principles that would apply to 
the entire DOT.24
21
 1966 Conference Report, supra note 17, at 11-12.
22
 Gray, supra note 13, at 334-35. See Department of Transportation Act of Oct. 25, 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-670, 80 Stat. 931. (1966).
23 Gray, supra note 13, at 329
24 Id. at 328-329.  The modal agencies created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 
included the following: the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and  
the Federal Highway Administration.  "Other organizations transferred to DOT included the Coast 
Guard, from Treasury; the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), from Commerce to the new FHWA; and the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation."  Id. at 329.
11
Among the general principles that Congress added to the DOT Act of 1966 
were two sections--§§ 2(a) and (b)(2), Declaration of Purpose and § 4(f).25  These two 
provisions, along with the Yarborough Amendment described above, were later to 
become what is now commonly known within the transportation and environmental 
law practice areas as "§ 4(f)."26  Section 2(a) of the DOT Act of 1966 states the 
following:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare, the economic growth 
and stability of the Nation and its security require the development of national 
transportation policies and programs conducive to the provision of fast, safe, 
efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent therewith 
and with other national objectives, including the efficient utilization and 
conservation of the Nation's resources (emphasis added).27
§ 2(b)(2) notes the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special efforts should be 
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and 
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.28
The Senate Committee on Government Operations, one of the committees 
charged with creating the DOT, also issued a committee report to accompany S. 3010, 
the Senate's bill to establish the DOT.  In this report, the committee noted that § 4(f) 
and the policy statements in § 2 "are designed to insure that in planning highways, 
railroad rights-of-way, airports and other transportation facilities, care will be taken, 
to the maximum extent possible, not to interfere with or disturb established 
25 See CONFERENCE REPORT  OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1966, H. RPT. NO. 
2236, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter DOT Act Conference Report]
26 See e.g., SHERRY HUTT ET. AL., CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE 
MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION, AND PRESERVATION OF HERITAGE RESOURCES at 15 (2004).
27 DOT Act Conference Report, supra note 25, at § 2(a).
28 Id. at § 2(b)(2).
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recreational facilities and refuges."29  This statement by using the language "to the 
maximum extent possible" implies that the Secretary, while being directed to apply a 
rigorous approach when evaluating § 4(f) protected lands, is also allowed to temper 
that approach with pragmatism i.e., he or she must protect the lands but in doing so 
must only approve an approach that is "possible" or workable.
1. Conference Report Language -- § 4(f)
The conference report for the DOT Act goes on to describe other broad 
guiding principles for DOT.  In § 4, several general provisions are articulated that 
apply to DOT and are not specific to any one modal administration.30  Among these 
general provisions is § 4(f) that, as enacted as part of the DOT Act of 1966, stated the 
following:
The Secretary shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, 
Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in 
developing transportation plans and programs that includes measures to 
maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed.  After the 
effective date of this Act, the Secretary shall not approve any program or 
project which requires the use of any land from a public park, recreation area, 
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site unless (1) there is no feasible 
and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes 
all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, 
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.31
This conference report language was the result of the conferees adopting a substitute 
amendment that made minor, but significant, changes to the original Senate language 
29 S. REP. NO. 1659, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1966).
30 DOT Act Conference Report, supra note 25, at § 4(f).
31 Id.  This language has been subsequently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2004).
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of S. 3010 as amended.32  Most notable of these changes was the addition of the 
words "and prudent" after "feasible."33  The impact of these additions will be 
explored in more detail below.
2. Conference Report Debate -- § 4(f)
During the House's floor consideration of the conference report, there was 
discussion by some Members of Congress who raised concerns about the scope and 
reach of § 4(f).  Congressman Kluczynski (D-IL) noted that while he generally 
supported the bill, he "sound[ed] a word of caution in interpreting § 4(f)."34  He 
argued that the "protection of our parks, open spaces, historic sites, fish and game 
habitats, and the other natural resources with which our Nation is so richly endowed 
is of the utmost importance and urgency, but not to the total exclusion of other 
considerations."35  In fact, to provide disproportionate protections to these "protected" 
resources "would result in as many inequities as justifying transportation plans merely 
on the basis of economy or efficiency."36  He continued his observations by 
identifying some of the "other considerations" that should be taken into account when 
reviewing the efficacy of a particular transportation project.  These other 
considerations "would include the integrity of neighborhoods, the displacement of 
32 Id.  "The conference substitute amendment adopts the Senate amendment language except for adding 
the words "and prudent" after the word "feasible." Id.
33 Id.
34
 112 CONG. REC. 26651 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (statement of Rep. Kluczynski on the DOT Act 
Conference Report).
35 Id.
36 Id.
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people and businesses, and the protection of schools, and churches and the myriad of 
other social and human values we find in our communities."37  As will be noted in 
more detail below, these "other considerations" have formed the basis of many 
present-day concerns regarding the application of this section.  Congressman 
Kluczynski, in fact, anticipated many of the issues that have arisen in litigation and in 
policy debates since the passage of this provision.
Also joining Congressman Kluczynski in his concerns about § 4(f) was his 
fellow Illinois congressional delegation colleague, Congressman Rostenkowski, who 
would later go on to lead the influential House Ways and Means Committee.  Mr. 
Rostenkowski, while supportive of the inclusion of § 4(f) in the bill, reiterated 
concerns that were originally raised during debate on the Yarborough Amendment to 
the Federal Highway Act.38  "Fear was expressed," Congressman Rostenkowski 
noted, "that the [Yarborough] amendment might be misinterpreted to mean the 
preservation of natural and manmade resources would be the overriding consideration 
in highway construction."39  Rostenkowski made clear that his support for this 
provision was contingent upon the inclusion of guidelines that required the Secretary 
of Transportation to consider the feasibility and prudence of alternatives to use 
protected lands and also to use "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the lands 
protected by the section.  These guidelines provide both protection to the lands 
37 Id.  Congressman Kluczynski ultimately did support the bill because he believed the planning 
requirements and insertion of the word "prudent" as a modifier for the types of alternatives that must 
be considered made § 4(f) "workable and effective."  Nevertheless, the "word of caution" that he raised 
regarding this section remains valid particularly as it relates to the "other considerations" he believed 
must be accounted for when conducting an analysis under this section.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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identified in the section and also give the Secretary a measure of discretion in his or 
her review process.  This measure of discretion was important to Congressman 
Rostenkowski, and he specifically noted that he wanted "the Record to show… that it 
is not the intent of Congress to tie the Secretary's hands."40  Congressman 
Rostenkowski's statements, along with those of Congressman Kluczynski, provide a 
key foundation for the interpretation of § 4 (f).
In order to further illustrate his concerns, Congressman Rostenkowski offered 
up several examples of situations in which the application of § 4(f) to real-life 
situations might prove problematic.41  He envisioned situations where the Secretary 
might have to "choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or saving human lives by 
a highway improvement" or choose "between using public parkland or displacing 
hundreds of families.42  Therefore, to ensure that these types of Hobbesian choices 
could be avoided to the maximum extent possible, Congressman Rostenkowksi 
argued that "[Congress] should memorialize the Secretary to give full consideration to 
the preservation of public lands, but not at the expense of human lives and human 
welfare."43  With these concerns articulated, Congressman Rostenkowski offered his 
support for the provision and the conference report, believing that the language would 
adequately address his concerns.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 26651-52.
43 Id. at 256652.
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C. Federal- Aid Highway Act of 1968
After passage and enactment of both the Yarborough Amendment to the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 and § 4(f) of the DOT Act of 1966, it quickly 
became apparent that the slight variation between the two provisions--one applying 
only to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (the Yarborough Amendment) 
and the other applying to the entire DOT, including the FHWA as well as other modal 
agencies (§ 4(f))--created confusion with state and local governments and in the 
transportation community.44  The language of the Yarborough Amendment as 
codified did not include the "feasible and prudent alternatives" analysis required 
under § 4(f).  As a result of this discrepancy and the cloud it cast over transportation 
projects, Congress revisited this issue in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.45
Initially, the House and Senate Public Works Committees46 proposed to 
correct this discrepancy by "chang[ing] § 4(f) to read more like § 138."47  This 
proposal was met with opposition by the environmental and preservationist 
communities48 and necessitated a different approach by the conference committee in 
order to find an acceptable solution.  The result was that "both § 4(f) of the DOT Act 
44
 § 4(f) Policy Paper, Federal Highway Administration (September 24, 1987, revised June 7, 1989), 
available at http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/4fpolicy.htm [hereinafter 4(f) Policy Paper].  See 
also Gray, supra note 13, at 338.
45
 Gray, supra note 13, at 338.
46
 At the time, these two committees were the committees of authorizing jurisdiction.  Today, the 
committees of primary jurisdiction over the FHWA and the DOT are the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
47
 Gray, supra note 13, at 339.
48
 Gray, supra note 13, at 339.  The environmental community was concerned that eliminating the 
"feasible and prudent alternatives" requirement in favor of a mere "consideration of alternatives" 
would water down the overall provision and result in more loss of protected lands.
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and § 138 were amended so as to be identical to each other."49  The resulting 
conference language as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be 
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and 
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.  The 
Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of 
the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the 
States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures 
to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed.  After the 
effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not 
approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned 
land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of 
national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or 
local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of 
national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless 
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) 
such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, 
recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from 
such use.50
Essentially, the new language used § 4(f) as the base text and added a few new 
provisions.51  First, § 2(b) of the DOT Act of 1966 was incorporated into the 
beginning as a statement of national policy.  Second, the words "publicly owned" 
were inserted as a modifier for "land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife 
and waterfowl refuge."52  Finally, the lands protected by the section were to be of 
"national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or local 
49
 Gray, supra note 13, at 339-340.
50
 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).
51
 Gray, supra note 13, at 340.
52
 Note that the modifier "publicly owned" does not apply to historic sites.  See Gray, supra note 13 at 
340. 
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officials."53  These changes ensured that the "feasible and prudent alternatives" 
language remained in effect--an issue of importance to the environmental community.
A review of the committee reports accompanying this legislation also reveals 
Congressional concern over the scope and application of § 4(f).  House Report No. 
1799 noted the following:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to make it 
unmistakably clear that neither section constitutes a mandatory prohibition 
against the use of enumerated lands; but rather, is a discretionary authority 
which must be used with both wisdom and reason.  The Congress does not 
believe, for example, that substantial numbers of people should be required to 
move in order to preserve these lands, or that clearly enunciated a local 
preference should be overturned on the basis of this authority.54
This clearly indicates that Congress did not necessarily intend that § 4(f) be strictly 
and stringently interpreted.  In fact, the legislative history indicates a strong 
inclination for local decision-making.  The legislative history also notes that § 4(f) 
should be applied with "wisdom and reason."  As will be seen in the discussion 
below, this issue has been a source of contention and disagreement among some of 
the circuit courts of appeal.
D. Recodification of the DOT Act of 1983 and Amendment of 1987
Section 4(f) remained unchanged until, as part of an "overall recodification of 
the DOT Act, § 4(f) was amended and codified in 49 U.S.C. § 303."55  This version of 
4(f) remains in effect today with only one minor change occurring since this 
53 See Gray, supra note 13 at 340.
54
 H. Rep. No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3531, 
3538.
55
 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 3. 
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recodification56. The language of § 4(f) currently in effect is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
303:
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and 
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the 
Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, 
and with the States, in developing transportation plans and programs that
include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of lands crossed 
by transportation activities or facilities.
(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project 
requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation areas or 
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or land of an historic site of national, State, or 
local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials 
having jurisdiction over the park, recreation areas refuge, or site) only if, 
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; 
and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to 
minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl 
refuges or historic site resulting from the use.57
As can be seen upon comparison of the above language with the earlier 
versions, no substantial changes were made to § 4(f).  In addition, as the FHWA 
noted, "[t]he legislative history of the 1983 recodification indicates that no 
substantive change was intended" to § 4(f).58  Moreover, "because of  familiarity with 
§ 4(f) by thousands of Federal and state personnel, the Federal Highway 
Administration continues to refer to the requirements as § 4(f)".59  Unfortunately, "§ 
56
 The only additional change made to § 4(f) since the 1983 recodification was a 1987 amendment.  
This amendment inserted in subsection (c) after "requiring the use" the following language: "(other 
than any project for a road or parkway under § 204 of title 23)".  See 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2004); See also
Pub. L. No. 100-17, Title I, § 133(d), 101 Stat. 173.
57
 49 U.S.C. § 303.
58
 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 4.
59 Id.
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138 was not amended, so the wording in the two sections is once again different."60
Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. § 303 as recodified in 1983 and slightly modified in 1987 
represents the current statutory treatment of § 4(f), and it is this current form that has 
been the subject of ongoing debate within the transportation and environmental 
communities.
III. EXPLORING THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS – A SPLIT 
AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Since its inception, § 4(f) has been the subject of debate and differing opinions 
as to its meaning and scope.61  In fact, "[n]ext to the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), § 4(f) has been the most frequently litigated environmental statute in the 
Federal Highway program."62  It has also been "the most frequent cause of court 
injunctions halting highway programs."63  These many cases have helped define the 
landscape of § 4(f), and as will be seen in the discussion below, some facets of the 
section have been interpreted differently in certain circuits.  The discussion below 
focuses, first, on the seminal § 4(f) Supreme Court case--Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe64--and then turns to key, representative cases from several different 
U.S. Courts of Appeal that highlight the competing views on the scope and 
application of § 4 (f) taken by some circuits.  As will be seen, these differing 
60 Id.
61 See e.g., 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 4.
62 § 4(F) - INTRODUCTION: LEGAL OVERVIEW (2004), available at 
http://www.§4f.com/case_studies.htm (last visited June 11, 2004) (overview of § 4(f) legal issues).
63 Id.
64 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 402.
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viewpoints tend to fall primarily into one of two camps: (1) a more flexible, balanced 
approach; and (2) a more stringent and strict approach.
A. U.S. Supreme Court -- Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
Interestingly enough--despite the large volume of litigation involving § 4(f)--
only one case concerning § 4(f) has been litigated before the Supreme Court.65  This 
case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,66 involved the review of a proposed 
highway project in Memphis, Tennessee.67
The plaintiffs/petitioners--a group of private citizens allied to stop the use of 
Overton Park for a highway--challenged the Secretary of Transportation's approval of 
a planned highway project that was to be routed through the park.68  The citizens' 
group argued that the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) did not properly meet 
his obligations under § 4(f).  First, they alleged the Secretary did not produce a formal 
finding documenting his decision, thus making it difficult for the court to analyze and 
review the Secretary's decision.69  Second, alternative routes that would not impact 
the park existed and these alternatives were both "feasible and prudent."70   Third, and 
finally, the citizens argued that even if those alternatives were deemed not "feasible 
and prudent," "all possible" methods were not taken to minimize the highway's harm 
65 Id.
66 Id..
67 Id. at 406.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 408.
70 Id.
22
to the park.71  The Secretary argued that his approval of the project was based upon 
the fact that the route through the park was authorized by the Bureau of Public Roads 
in 1956 and also approved by local officials.72  Affidavits attesting to the rationale of 
the Secretary in making his decision as well as indicating the independence with 
which he exercised his project approval discretion were introduced at the district 
court.73
Both the district court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of the Secretary 
and noted in their decisions that the Secretary did not need to make formal findings 
when approving the project and that his authority and discretion was broad.74  The 
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall and joined by five of his 
brethren,75 reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.76  The 
Court noted that while formal findings on the part of the Secretary were not required, 
additional evidence beyond that provided for in the affidavits was needed to support 
the Secretary's decision.77  Therefore, the case was remanded to the district court for 
further investigation as to the Secretary's rationale in approving the project and his 
decision-making process.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 406.
73 Id. at 409.  Opposing and contradicting affidavits were also filed by the citizens group.
74 Id. at 409.
75 Id. at 403.  Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, 
Stewart, White and Blackmun.
76 Id. at 406.
77 Id. at 409.
23
Overton Park, however, is notable in § 4(f) practice and lore for the 
statements made in the opinion's dicta.78  It is these statements that have attributed 
much to the interpretation of § 4(f) and have also been the subject of discussion in 
some of the more recent federal decisions concerning § 4(f).  Chief among the issues 
raised in Overton Park's dicta is the Court's statement that the Secretary may not 
approve a project that would result in "destruction of parkland" unless the alternative 
to using the parkland would itself pose "unique problems."79
The Court elaborates on what constitutes a "unique" problem.  Factors 
regarding the alternatives to using parkland or other protected lands such as "cost, 
directness of route, and community disruption" are not considered to be unique 
according to the Court.80  These types of factors were already taken into account 
when § 4(f) was enacted because "if Congress [had] intended these factors to be on an 
equal footing with the preservation of parkland there would have been no need for [§ 
4(f)]."81  In taking this position, the Court rejected the Secretary's contention that he 
should be able to "engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests."82
And, as will be seen below, some circuits have backed away from this outright 
rejection of a balancing test as it applies to determining whether no "feasible and 
78
 In addition, the case is noteworthy in the administrative law field.  See e.g., Mashaw, supra note 9, at 
708-718.
79 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413.
80 Id. at 411.
81 Id. at 412.
82 Id.
24
prudent" alternative exists to the use of protected lands.83  Others circuits, however, 
have followed closely the dicta in Overton Park and required a clear showing that a 
"unique problem" with an alternative route justifies encroachment on a park or other 
protected land.84
B. Flexibility and Balance -- 7th, 4th and D.C. Circuits
The late 1960's and the 1970's represented a time of peak expansion of the 
interstate highway system.85  It was a time when new roads and highways were being 
built in large numbers and a time when many were concerned that parks and historic 
areas would be lost or destroyed to the advance of the bulldozer and road builders.86
It was precisely for these reasons and to address these concerns that § 4(f) was 
enacted.87  However, as "[t]oday's highway program is oriented much more toward 
system preservation and modernization" rather than to system expansion, the "rigid 
rules for applying § 4(f)" are often out of step with real world practices.88  Several 
circuit courts have reflected this notion in their decisions and have moved the § 4(f) 
jurisprudence away from the strict constructionist view espoused by Overton Park.  
83 See e.g., Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987); Hickory Neighborhood Defense 
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
84 See e.g., La. Envtl. Soc’y v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1976); Druid Hills Civic Assoc. v. 
FHWA, 772 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985); Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Brinegar, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).
85 See e.g., FHWA History, supra note 3, at 10-13.
86 See e.g., SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12, at 27.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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The following discussion analyzes several key and representative cases that have 
favored a more flexible and balanced interpretation and application of § 4(f).
1. Eagle Foundation v. Dole -- 7th Circuit
One of the seminal cases that helped define a newer approach to interpreting § 
4(f) is Eagle Foundation v. Dole.89  This case involved a challenge to a planned four-
lane highway to connect Decatur, Springfield and Jacksonville, Illinois with 
Hannibal, Missouri.90  This connection necessitated constructing a bridge to cross the 
Illinois River.91  The plans for the bridge were controversial because its construction 
impacted both the Pike County Conservation Area,92 parts of which serve as winter 
roosting spots for the bald eagle, as well as the Wade Farm, an historic farm dating to 
the 1840’s that was also eligible for inclusion in the National Register for Historic 
Places.93
Due to the potential impacts that this transportation project posed to both a 
wildlife refuge and an historic place, § 4(f) was necessarily implicated.  The 
plaintiffs/appellants--Eagle Foundation, Inc.94--"sought to block construction of the 
highway on the ground that… § 4(f) prohibited the construction as a substantive 
89 Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987).
90 Id. at 800.
91 Id.
92
 "… the 862-acre Pike County Conservation Area (PCCA), which includes Napolean Hallow, was 
established to preserve wildlife, some to be watched and some to be hunted."  Id. at 800.
93 Id.
94
 Eagle Foundation, in addition to having an interest in any development in the PCCA that might 
disrupt the habitat of the bald eagles known to inhabit the area, also had a leasehold interest in the 
Wade Farm.  Id. at 801.
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manner."95  The trial court held that the "Secretary [of Transportation] did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that… no other placement of the bridge 
across the Illinois River is 'feasible and prudent.'"96  In addition, the trial court also 
held that the plans for the highway "minimize[d] the harm" to the protected 
property.97  Thus, the Secretary was found to be in compliance with both prongs of § 
4(f), and the court allowed the project to proceed even though it impacted § 4(f)-
protected property because no other "feasible and prudent" alternative existed and any 
harms to the protected lands were minimized.  Eagle Foundation, subsequently 
appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Writing the opinion for the three judge panel, Judge Easterbrook upheld the 
district court's decision and provided a new interpretation of the views espoused in 
Overton Park.  Easterbrook argued that the Secretary of Transportation should be 
given a fair amount of latitude in applying and interpreting the § 4(f) requirements.98
More significantly, the decision in Eagle Foundation established the notion that the 
Secretary, in carrying out his or her responsibilities pursuant to § 4(f), should balance 
competing interests in determining what is "feasible and prudent."99  This is a clear 
departure from the rigid interpretations voiced in Overton Park.100
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 804.  "The statutory standard makes deferential review inevitable."  Id.
99 Id.
100 Cf. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.  "… no such wide-ranging endeavor [referencing the Secretary's 
assertion that he be allowed to 'engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests'] was 
intended [by Congress]"  Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 798.
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However, Eagle Foundation did not stop with the statement that the Secretary 
be allowed to engage in a balancing test to determine whether or not a project should 
be advanced given the § 4(f) requirements.  In fact, it went further--directly taking 
issue with the Supreme Court's use of the word "unique" to describe those types of 
problems that are required to be proven in order to warrant or justify using a protected 
land for a highway project.  Essentially, the Eagle Foundation court argued that if the 
Supreme Court really meant what it said regarding "unique" problems being required 
to be shown to justify the taking of a protected land for a highway project then there 
would be virtually no such situation in reality that would fit this description because 
these type of problems and situations are almost never unique, i.e., almost never "one 
of a kind."101  A review, according to the court, of the legislative intent of § 4(f), 
argues against "such an extreme position."102
The court goes on to state that "we cannot believe… the Supreme Court meant 
that if a risk or cost has been accepted, or an obstacle overcome, for any highway in 
the United States, then it always must be accepted or overcome in preference to the 
use of any § 4(f) lands…"103  Indeed, all that is necessary for the Secretary to 
overcome the presumption against using § 4(f) lands is a "good," and prudent 
reason.104  Once "the Secretary makes that hard decision, it must be respected."105
101 Id.  In discussing the Supreme Court's requirement that a problem be "unique" in order to allow a 
highway project to take protected land, the court observed that "'[u]nique'" is a word without degree; a 
situation is unique (nonpareil, one of a kind) or it is not."  Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 805.
105 Id.
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While this interpretation of the requirements of § 4(f) clearly redefines and 
reframes the scope and depth of § 4(f) review by both the Secretary and the courts, 
Eagle Foundation provides yet a further redefinition.  In conducting a § 4(f) review 
and inquiry, the Secretary may take into account "everything important that 
matters."106  Thus, a Secretary may approve a project even though it requires the 
taking and/or use of § 4(f) protected lands if "[a] cumulation of small problems" so 
warrants such action.107  This reasoning would likely not withstand the rigid 
construction articulated by the Overton Park Court.  However, "aggregate injuries," if 
sufficient, may even meet the threshold test of uniqueness as espoused by Overton 
Park.108  In Eagle Foundation, the court cited a "two-volume study" as evidence of an 
accumulation of problems that justified routing the highway through otherwise 
protected lands.109  This new gloss on Overton Park substantially enlarged the 
discretion of the Secretary when conducting a § 4(f) review.  No longer would the 
Secretary be confined to a consideration of only large, "unique" problems when 
reviewing the efficacy of a highway project; now, "[e]ven a featherweight drawback 
may play some role."110
Related to the issue of considering aggregate problems and injuries is the issue 
of how searching should a § 4(f) review and inquiry be in terms of looking at these 
106 Id.
107 Id.  The court also cited Town of Fenton v. Dole, 636 F.Supp. 557, 567 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 792 F.2d 
44 (2d Cir. 1986), to support this "cumulation" argument.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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alternatives and potential problems.111  This is an issue that continues to vex highway 
and transportation planners and can often drive project costs up as reviews try to be 
all encompassing .112  Rather than have the highway planners continue to "look at a 
few more" options, the court argued that the proper inquiry is "whether enough have 
been examined to permit a sound judgment that the study of additional variations is 
not worthwhile."113  In the instant case, the court found that DOT "examined more 
than ten routes"114 within a "ten by six mile area."115  The court deemed this level and 
scope of review and analysis by the Secretary as sufficient.116
Finally, the court considered the issue of whether or not the Secretary 
approved a plan that minimized the harms to the § 4(f) protected lands.117  As with its 
finding regarding the scope of review for alternatives, the court also found the 
Secretary took sufficient steps in approving a plan that would "minimize the harms" 
to the protected lands.118  The court also noted that the requirement to "minimize the 
harms" should be viewed in the context of a broader "national interest" in protecting § 
4(f) protected lands.119  Therefore, taking and using a small amount of protected lands 
111 Id. at 807.
112 See infra, Part V.A.1
113 Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 807.
114 Id. at 805.
115 Id. at 807.
116 Id. at 808.
117 Id. at 809-810.
118 Id. at 810.
119 Id.
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may be justified if the alternative might mean "more total damage" to other protected 
lands.120
Eagle Foundation represented another piece in the increasingly fractured 
picture of what § 4(f) means in both the legal and the practical settings.  The case, a 
victory for highway and transportation advocates, further widened the gap between 
the circuits over how to interpret § 4(f), as well as how to apply the principles of 
Overton Park.  Indeed, for the first time since Overton Park, a U.S. Court of Appeals 
set forth a significant, new interpretation of Overton Park.  Now, for projects in the 
Midwestern states of the Seventh Circuit (Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin), the 
Secretary of Transportation was provided with a broader discretion when exercising 
his or her judgment on transportation projects. The Secretary could now do the 
following: balance competing interests when determining whether or not an 
alternative might be “feasible and prudent”; consider an accumulation of problems in 
making the same determination; and take into account a broader national interest 
when signing off on steps to minimize harms to protected lands, the use or taking of 
which may be required to advance a transportation project.  This interpretation altered 
the landscape surrounding § 4(f), and as will be seen below it caused other circuit 
courts to follow its lead.
2. Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner -- 4th Circuit
Three years after Eagle Foundation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
joined with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of § 4(f).  In Hickory Neighborhood 
120 Id.
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Defense League v. Skinner,121 the court considered a challenge to the Secretary of 
Transportation's approval of a highway widening project part of which required using 
property in an historic district.122  The plaintiff-appellant, the Hickory Neighborhood 
Defense League, sought to enjoin this project on the grounds that the Secretary did 
not adhere to his responsibilities under § 4(f).123  The district court rejected this 
challenge and found that the Secretary had complied with § 4(f).124  This decision was 
appealed and the Fourth Circuit in Hickory Neighborhood I125, remanded the case 
back to the district court for additional review on the question of whether "the 
Secretary determined that the alternatives to the widening of N.C. Highway 127 were 
not prudent in light of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe."126  Upon 
remand, the district court, again, found that the Secretary acted appropriately under § 
4(f), and this decision was, again, appealed.127
In considering this second appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed the views 
espoused in Eagle Foundation and found that the Secretary had properly exercised his 
discretion under § 4(f).  In reaching this decision, the court noted that the touchstone 
words used by the Supreme Court in Overton Park, namely the use of "unique" and 
"extraordinary" in describing those problems that justified approval of a project 
121
 Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner II, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
122 Id. at 161.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 162.
125
 Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner 893, F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1990).
126 Hickory Neighborhood, 910 F.2d at 162.
127 Id.
32
requiring the use of § 4(f) protected lands, were not to be substituted for the statutory 
term "prudent."128  Thus, the Secretary need not "expressly indicate a finding of 
unique problems" as long as the "record amply supports [his or her] conclusion that… 
there were compelling reasons for rejecting the proposed alternatives as not 
prudent."129
The Hickory Neighborhood court also affirmed the "cumulation of problems" 
rationale as an independent or additional basis that a Secretary may cite in approving 
a project under § 4(f).130  Again, this holding both affirms the reasoning articulated in 
Eagle Foundation and represents a further distancing from the standards set forth in 
Overton Park.  It also further highlighted a growing split among the circuits as to how 
strictly § 4(f) should be interpreted and applied.  By the time of Hickory 
Neighborhood, nearly 20 years had passed since Overton Park and in that time span 
numerous 4(f) cases had been litigated, with some courts such as those in Eagle 
Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood taking a more balanced, more pro-
transportation view on § 4(f), while other courts, as the discussion below will 
indicate, adopted a more strict, more pro-environment and historic preservation 
viewpoint regarding § 4(f).  The debate and the split continues.
3. Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey -- D.C. Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has addressed 
numerous § 4(f) issues over the years.  In Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 
128 Id. at 162-63 citing Eagle Found. 813 F.2d 798, 804-05 (7th Cir 1987).
129 Hickory Neighborhood, 910 F.2d at 163 (4th Cir. 1990).
130 Id. See also discussion, supra at Part III.B.2.
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the court reviewed a § 4(f) challenge to an airport expansion project in Toledo, Ohio 
alleging that noise impacts to the Oak Openings Preserve Metropark would be caused 
by the airport expansion.131  The plaintiffs-appellants, a citizens' group formed in 
opposition to the project at issue, argued the expansion would "constructively 'use'" a 
campground in the Metropark by "subject[ing] the camp to nighttime noise of up to 
Ldn 75 decibels."132  This argument was rejected by the district court, and Citizens 
Against Burlington appealed to the D.C. Circuit.133
In considering this constructive use argument, the court turned to Overton 
Park for guidance.  Making a point to highlight the deferential standard of review that 
must be accorded to agency decision-makers under Overton Park, the court noted that 
if an agency's "decision was reasonable [then]… we are not entitled to displace its 
decision with our own or with anyone else's."134  The key word, here, is "reasonable."  
The D.C. Circuit cited the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) findings as well 
as those of the district court and upheld the agency findings as appropriate and not in 
violation of § 4(f).135  Thus, the court implicitly stated that it is "reasonable" for the 
FAA to conclude that the only alternative presented to the airport expansion was to 
expand an airport in Fort Wayne, Indiana and that alternative would be contrary to the 
131
 Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
132 Id. at 203.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 203-04.
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goals of this transportation project--"providing the Toledo area with a modern, 
effective cargo hub."136
The significance of this case with respect to § 4(f) jurisprudence is the court's 
restatement of the Overton Park deferential standard of review for agency decisions.  
This standard can, at times, be lost as courts wade into the intricacies of § 4(f) and 
literally fail to see the forest through the trees.  Courts in § 4(f) cases are often called 
upon to interject their opinion or their own analysis as to which alignment or which 
alternative should be approved.  Citizens Against Burlington stands as a reminder that 
"federal courts are neither empowered nor competent to micromanage strategies for 
saving the nation's parklands."137 Rather, the federal agencies should be given 
deference by courts in reviewing their actions as the agencies are better equipped to 
apply laws such as § 4(f).
4. Sierra Club v. Dole -- D.C. Circuit
In the case of Sierra Club v. Dole138, the D.C. Circuit evaluated a challenge to 
a plan to allow Boeing 737 jet airplanes to operate out of Jackson Hole Airport in 
Wyoming.  One of the key issues this case examines is the threshold line that must be 
crossed in order for a use of protected lands to be deemed prohibited under § 4(f).139
136 Id. at 204.
137 Id. at 205.  This statement was made specifically in response to a request by the Citizens Against 
Burlington for "us to force the FAA to pinpoint the new campground's geographic coordinates."  Id.
However, the statement was part of a more general discussion by the court on the importance of being 
deferential to the decisions of the agencies.  The court argued strongly that "Congress wanted the 
agencies, not the courts, to evaluate plans to reduce environmental damage."  Id.
138
 Sierra Club v. Dole, 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
139 See id. at 129.
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How significant must the use of protected lands be to trigger the requirements of § 
4(f)?  Since propeller planes were already operating out of the airport--and had been 
for over forty-five years--the case turned on whether or not the additional noise from 
the jet airplanes amounted to a "constructive use" of the nearby Grand Teton National 
Park. 140
The court held that the additional noise did not constitute a use under § 4(f).141
Citing legislative history, the court noted that "Congress gave no indication that [§ 
4(f)] was intended to create ongoing review of relatively minor changes in the 
operational characteristics of an established transportation facility."  In effect, the 
court recognized that certain exceptions might apply to § 4(f) and allowed for a 
degree of flexibility in how § 4(f) is administered.  As the court noted, "[i]t can hardly 
be expected, once an airport has been in operation, that every change in flight 
scheduling or operations must be accompanied" by a § 4(f) evaluation.  This approach 
makes common sense and any "contrary view of the statute would produce a blizzard 
of useless [§ 4(f)] statements."142  If Sierra Club v. Dole represents one end of the § 
4(f) spectrum, there is an equal and opposite end as the following discussion will 
explore.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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C. Strict Interpretation -- 5th, 9th and 11th Circuits
While some circuits were busy putting their own different interpretations on 
Overton Park, other circuits were content not to stray from the Overton Park line of 
reasoning.  These latter circuits chose a path supported by many in the environmental 
and historic preservation communities that seek to have a high bar established for any 
transportation project requiring the use of § 4(f) protected lands.  The following 
discussion examines this path and the key cases from those circuits that have pursued 
such a course. 
1. Louisiana Environmental Society v. Coleman – 5th Circuit
In one of the earlier cases litigated after Overton Park, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered a case in Louisiana involving the construction of a highway 
project through a recreational area known as Cross Lake.143  In Louisiana 
Environmental Society v. Coleman, the plaintiff-appellant, Louisiana Environmental 
Society (LES), challenged the approval of a project by the Secretary as not being 
consistent with the criteria of § 4(f) and that the Secretary's findings were not 
supported by fact.144  The district court denied this challenge and refused to issue a 
permanent injunction against the project setting up an appeal by LES and the 
subsequent decision by the Fifth Circuit.145
143 See La. Envtl. Soc’y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1976).
144 Id. at 81-82.
145 Id. at 81.
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Using the guideposts provided by Overton Park, the court considered three 
main questions that must be answered when reviewing a case under § 4(f).146  First, 
"[c]ould [the Secretary] have reasonably believed that there was no substantial taking 
[of a recreational area]?"147  Second, "[c]ould the Secretary have reasonably 
believed… that there were truly unusual factors?"148  And, third, "[c]ould [the 
Secretary] have reasonably believed that the alternate routes presented unique 
problems?"149  As the court indicated, "an affirmative answer to any [of these 
questions] would require dismissing  the plaintiffs' attack on the Secretary's § 4(f) 
determination."150
These questions track closely to the analysis put forth in Overton Park and 
stand in contrast to the decisions in Eagle Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood that 
were to come some ten years or more later.151  The court, in this case, was not yet 
ready to move away from the strict § 4 (f) interpretation established by Overton Park.  
In fact, it even added some additional gloss of its own.  The Fifth Circuit noted that 
"the spirit of Overton Park is clearly to the effect that the statute is to be read broadly 
to protect greenlands."152  Therefore, the court argued that even a minimal taking of 
protected lands for the purposes of advancing a transportation project is sufficient to 
146 Id. at 84.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See discussion supra Part III.B.
152
 537 F.2d 79, 84
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trigger the requirements of § 4(f).153  Any other interpretation of the requirements of § 
4(f) would "permit an initial appraisal of whether the use was substantial, [and]… 
would infuse consideration of elements (such as the degree of harm to the park, 
animal life, environment, etc.) which Congress did not want considered when it said, 
if there is another way take it."154  This interpretation, again, contrasts sharply with 
the balancing approach offered by Eagle Foundation and its progeny.
In examining if "unusual factors" might warrant the use of §4(f) protected 
lands, the court delineated several points of analysis to guide DOT's § 4(f) review 
process.  Most notably, the court stated that "§ 4(f)(1) requires that each 'alternative to 
the use' of the parkland must be found to be either infeasible or imprudent before the 
Secretary can approve the use of parkland."155  In addition, "[a]n alternate route which 
uses any part of  park is not an alternative to use of the park."156  Thus, in this case, 
the court held that the Secretary's review of the alternatives was incomplete and "did 
not make the requisite testing of the various routes to determine how to keep harm to 
the lake to a minimum."157  These additional analytical requirements expanded the 
alternative review process that the Secretary must undertake pursuant to § 4(f) and, 
again, raised the bar to project development and construction requiring the use of 
parkland.
153 Id.  The court noted that "Overton Park [did not] enunciate any sort of substantial taking threshold 
for the applicability of § 4(f)."  Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 85.
156 Id. citing Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973) and 
Citizens to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 466 F. 2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972).
157 La. Envtl. Soc’y, 537 F.2d at 84.  In the case of the Cross Lake project, eight different alternatives 
were reviewed, some of which involved only minimal use of the parkland.
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On the issue of what constitutes a "unique" problem that would justify the 
taking or use of a § 4(f) protected land, the Fifth Circuit added to the Overton Park
definition by noting that a long time delay is not a "unique" problem.158  This is a 
substantial enlargement of the Overton Park definition because in this particular case 
the lower court had found that proceeding with an alternative route that did not use a 
protected land would add ten additional years to the project.159  Even a delay as 
substantial as a decade was insufficient to rise to the status of "unique."  The court 
observed that "[i]f time is the penalty, it cannot be turned into an exception which 
justifies noncompliance."160
Overall, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Louisiana Environmental Society both 
affirms and expands Overton Park.  It rejects the notion that a protected property 
taking must be "substantial" in order to activate § 4(f) requirements.  The decision 
denies the use of a balancing test that may justify building a project even though it 
uses or takes a § 4(f) protected land.  It also simultaneously expands the alternatives 
analysis review to ensure that no alternatives are considered that even minimally 
require the use of a protected land.  Finally, the court's opinion dismisses the 
argument that a lengthy delay--even one as long as a decade--constitutes a "unique" 
problem--the presence of which would allow the project to go forward even if it used 
protected property.
158 Id. at 85.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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2. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole -- 9th Circuit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Stop H-3 Association v. Dole161 took 
its turn at tackling § 4(f) issues, and like the court in Louisiana Environmental 
Society, it too affirmed Overton Park and also offered its own additional views on the 
scope of § 4(f).  Stop H-3 involved a § 4(f) challenge by three environmental and 
community groups162 to a planned Interstate highway project that required the taking 
and use of land from "two public parklands: (1) Ho'omaluhia Park, a major regional 
park; and (2) Pali Golf Course Park, one of Oahu's most challenging and heavily used 
public golf courses."163  After having their challenges turned aside by the district 
court, the groups appealed to the Ninth Circuit.164
Following Overton Park, the court ultimately reversed the district court's 
affirmation of the Secretary's decision to approve the H-3 highway project and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.165  The court noted that "the requirements 
of § 4(f) are stringent."166  It also reaffirmed the views of Overton Park regarding 
"unique problems."  Specifically, the court noted that the dislocation of a church, four 
businesses, thirty-one residences, increased noise, air and visual pollution, and higher 
costs were all insufficient to rise to the standard of "unique" problems requiring the 
161
 Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).
162
 Stop H-3 Association and Life of the Land--two non-profit organizations "chartered for the purpose 
of opposing the construction of H-3 and Hui Malama Aina O Ko'olau, an unincorporated association 
formed 'to protect the Hawaiian people, the Hawaiian lifestyle, and the land from destruction.'"  Id. at 
1446.
163 Id. at 1447-48.
164 Id. at 1446. 
165 Id. at 1458.
166 Id. at 1447.
41
approval of an alignment that would prevent such problems i.e., an alignment using 
parklands.167  In addition, the court declined to rule on a "totality of circumstances" 
theory argued at the trial court as justification for approving the alignment requiring 
the use of parklands because "even when amalgamated [the reasons] do not satisfy the 
Overton Park standards."168
While Stop H-3 is important for its affirmation of Overton Park, it is also 
important for its commentary on two additional issues that often arise in § 4(f) 
litigation: (1) how to weigh safety issues in the context of "unique" problems169 and 
(2) how to review "no build" alternatives.170  The court's observations on these issues, 
again, raised the "stringent" Overton Park standards.  And, according to some, they 
have substantially interfered with the "cooperative federalism" model that governs 
modern transportation project construction.171
On the issue of safety considerations, the court stated that "since they so 
directly involve human life, warrant extremely close scrutiny when determining 
whether such considerations satisfy the Overton Park standards."172  While "[n]either 
a court nor an agency should weigh lightly the potential risk to human life an 
alternative might pose," the court was also concerned that "undue deference" to such 
considerations might turn such inquiry into a "talisman" that might be cited in every § 
167 Id. at 1451.
168 Id. at 1451.
169 See id. at 1452.
170 See id. at 1455.
171 See id. (Wallace, J. concurring).
172 Stop H-3 Assoc., 740 F.2d at 1452.
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4(f) case to ensure approval or non-approval of a project or alternative depending on 
the desired outcome.173  In the end, the court determined that even safety 
considerations need to be "truly unusual factors" or "unique problems" in order to 
justify the rejection of a non-parkland alternative.174  Here, the Secretary argued that 
safety considerations justified rejection of the alignment that did not use parkland.175
These considerations included more complex traffic movements and more dangerous 
and confusing ramp curves and interchanges that were associated with the non-
parkland alignment.176  The court ruled, in this case, that the record was insufficient 
to determine whether such safety issues were "unique."177  Nevertheless, the court's 
pronouncement that even safety considerations must be of the "unique" or 
extraordinary variety in order to merit the rejection of an alternative that does not use 
protected lands is a considerable and additional hurdle for future projects to meet.
Turning to another matter that can often arise in § 4(f) litigation--reviewing a 
"no build" alternative--the court again strictly interpreted § 4(f) and established a 
stringent requirement for reviewing alternatives.178  The court stated that "[t]he mere 
fact that a 'need" for a highway has been 'established' does not prove that not to build 
the highway would be 'imprudent' under Overton Park."179  This statement makes it 
173 Id. at 1452-53.
174 Id. at 1453.
175 Id. at 1452-53.
176 Id. at 1453.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1455.
179 Id.
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more difficult to dismiss or discount a no-build alternative.  By citing Overton Park, 
the court applied the "truly unusual factors" and "unique problems" criteria that must 
be shown in order to reject an alternative.180  Moreover, "increased congestion or 
commuter delays" were deemed to be not "so unusual or extraordinary that the No 
Build [sic] alternative must be rendered imprudent."181  Thus, the court implies 
almost a presumption for the no build alternative, since congestion and commuter 
delays are often key factors in support of building a new highway.  In this particular 
case, the court ultimately held that the record did not adequately support a finding 
that the no build alternative was imprudent.182
It should be noted with respect to the no build alternative discussion, that 
Judge Wallace dissented on this issue.  He argued that by insisting on a determination 
as to the efficacy of a no build alternative, the court was "confusing the purposes" of 
§ 4(f).  Section 4(f) was not enacted as a threshold test on whether or not to build a 
project, rather "Congress intended [§ 4(f)] to regulate which way a government 
constructed a project."183  The position of the majority opinion on this issue 
"improperly interferes with the cooperative system" of highway building.184
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1456.
182 Id. at 1457.
183 Id. at 1468.  Judge Wallace maintained that "[o]ther laws such as NEPA [the National 
Environmental Policy Act] guide that first choice and include consideration of complete No Build 
alternatives."  Id.
184 Id.  The cooperative system refers to the joint federal, state and local role in transportation project 
development.
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3. Druid Hills Civic Association v. Federal Highway Administration --
11th Circuit
In Druid Hills Civic Association v. Federal Highway Administration, the 11th 
Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated a proposed highway project in Atlanta, Georgia 
part of which would impact the Druid Hills Historic District.185  The plaintiff-
appellant, the Druid Hills Civic Association, argued that the project was barred under 
§ 4(f).186  The district court had denied an earlier motion to enjoin the construction of 
the project.187
As with the previous cases, in fact as with virtually every § 4(f) case litigated 
after Overton Park, its principles have served as a guide for the court.188  The court 
restated many of the views espoused in the LES and Stop H-3 cases.189  In particular, 
it noted that "[a]n alternate route that also impacts upon parks and historic sites is not 
an 'alternative to the use' of such property."190  The court also made clear that there 
are "no exceptions to the requirement that there be no prudent alternatives to the use 
of parks and historic sites before the Secretary can approve a project using protected 
properties."191  Again, this "no exceptions" language speaks to the stringency with 
which some circuits, such as the 11th Circuit, have applied to § 4(f) cases.  
185
 Druid Hills Civic Assoc. v. FHWA, 772 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 708.
188 See id. at 714.
189 See id. at 714-15.
190 Id. at 715 citing La. Envtl. Soc’y, 537 F.2d at 85.
191 Druid Hills Civic Assoc., 772 F.2d at 716.
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In the end, the court remanded the case to the Secretary so that additional and 
more adequate findings could be made as to the issue of whether the chosen 
alignment properly comported with § 4(f) requirements.192  In its directive to the 
Secretary, the court noted that the review should "address the quantity of harm that 
will accrue to the park or historic site and the nature of that harm, e.g., visual impact 
or physical taking."  The court continued on to note that "[i]t will not suffice to 
simply state that an alternative route would affect 4(f) properties without providing 
some rational, documented basis for such a conclusion."  Such thorough, stringency is 
the "command of Overton Park and LES II and we are not free to ignore that 
directive."193
IV. EXPLORING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTERPRETATIONS
The Department of Transportation, the FHWA and DOT's other modal 
administrations, obviously, carefully scrutinize the judicial interpretations of § 4(f) to 
assist them with their own application of § 4(f).  Over the years, DOT has issued 
several guidance and policy documents to help explain, interpret and contribute to the 
understanding of § 4(f).194  It has also promulgated regulations195 regarding this 
section, as well as established a nationwide § 4(f) permit program.196  The discussion 
192 Id. at 718.
193 Id. at 719.
194 See generally 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44.
195 See Section 4(f), 23 C.F.R. § 771.135 (2004).
196
 52 Fed. Reg. 31,111 (1987).
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below will review the key DOT regulations, guidance documents, and programs that 
serve to help implement the directives of § 4(f).
A. Section 4(f) Regulations
In the 1980's, DOT issued a regulation that provides additional substantive 
details and procedural guidance on § 4(f).197  One of the main substantive provisions 
included in the regulations is essentially a restatement of Overton Park principles 
noting the following that the "Administration" may not approve a project that uses 
protected lands unless "there are unique problems or unusual factors involved" with 
such use or if "the cost, social, economic, and environmental impacts, or community 
disruption" of such use rises to "extraordinary magnitudes."198  However, the 
regulations do stipulate that some uses may not invoke § 4(f) protections.  For 
example, if the site being used is "not significant" based on a determination by 
officials who have jurisdiction over the park, recreation area or refuge, then § 4(f) 
review is not required.199  Also, the regulations recognize that certain "restoration, 
rehabilitation, or maintenance" activities of transportation facilities that are on the 
National Register of Historic Places are not subject to § 4(f).200  Although, the 
regulations provide for some flexibility, they have not yet adopted some of the 
197 See 23 C.F.R. § 771.135
198
 23 C.F.R. 771.135(a)(2).
199 Id. at 771.135(c).
200 Id. at 771.135(f).
47
broader, more balanced approaches discussed in such cases as Eagle Foundation and 
Hickory Neighborhood.201
In addition to an enunciation of the procedural requirements to be followed 
when reviewing transportation projects under § 4(f), the regulations devote 
considerable attention to defining and discussing the definition of "use" of a park, 
recreation area, refuge, or historic area.202  The regulations state that a "use" occurs 
when one of the following occurs: "land is permanently incorporated into a 
transportation facility;" "a temporary occupancy of land [occurs] that is adverse in 
terms of the statute's preservationist purposes;" or when there is a "constructive use of 
land."203  The term "constructive use" is further defined as a use that "does not 
incorporate land from a § 4(f) resource, but… [whose] impacts are so severe that the 
protected activities, features, or attributes that qualify a resource for protection under 
§ 4(f) are substantially impaired."204  Several examples of constructive uses that 
trigger § 4(f) requirements, as well as examples of activities that are not subject to § 
4(f), are also provided in the regulations.205  As would be expected, the above 
definitions and the examples tend to track the body of § 4(f) case law.
201 Compare Eagle Found., 813 F.2d 798 and Hickory Neighborhood, 910 F.2d 159 (the courts 
discussed a more flexible balancing approach in evaluating transportation projects under § 4(f)).  See 
also supra Part III.B.1-2.
202 See 23 C.F.R. 771.135(p).
203 Id. at 771.135(p)(i-iii).
204 Id. at 771.135(p)(2).
205 See id. at 771.135(p)(4-7).
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B. Section 4(f) Policy Paper
In addition to promulgating § 4(f) regulations, the FHWA also issued a 
detailed policy paper that is often cited in § 4(f) cases.206  This policy paper serves as 
a reference document for § 4(f), and the stated purpose of the paper is to delineate 
FHWA's policy positions that it adopted as a result of "court interpretations and many 
years of project-by- project applications."207  It should be noted that this paper 
"addresses only the programs and activities administered by FHWA."208
Nevertheless, it presents a useful (although legally non-binding) compendium of § 
4(f) information.
The policy paper cites the Overton Park "unique problems" standard that must 
be adhered to when reviewing a project alternative in light of § 4(f).209  In general, the 
policy paper also closely follows the regulations.  However, it does differ from the 
regulations in one significant manner.  The policy paper recognizes an important 
gloss to the strict Overton Park standard--the "cumulation of problems" approach that 
was articulated in Eagle Foundation.210  The paper specifically notes the following:
When making a finding that an alternative is not feasible and prudent, it is not 
necessary to show that any single factor presents unique problems.  Adverse 
factors such as environmental impacts, safety and geometric problems, 
decreased traffic service, increased costs, and any other factors may be 
considered collectively.211
206 See 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44.  This paper was issued on September 24, 1987 and then re-
issued as a revised edition on June 7, 1989.
207 Id. at 5.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 6.
210 Id. See also Eagle Found., 813 F.2d 798.
211
 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44.  
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This difference between the regulations and the policy paper reflects a split of sorts 
within the DOT and further contributes to the confusion and debate among some 
about the true scope and application of § 4(f). 
C. Nationwide § 4(f) Evaluations and Approvals
While no statutory changes have been made to § 4(f) since the 1983 and 1987 
recodifications and modifications, one significant development did occur in how the 
FHWA implements its responsibilities under § 4(f).  In 1987, FHWA issued 
guidelines that allowed for the "expedited approval of those federally-aided highway 
projects having 'minor involvement' with historic sites, public parks, recreations 
lands, and wildlife and waterfowl refuges."212  These guidelines are similar to other 
"nationwide" permit programs used by the Army Corps of Engineers and other 
agencies in the implementation of the Clean Water Act213 and allow agencies a degree 
of efficiency in carrying out regulatory mandates.  If a particular project or program 
meets the conditions spelled out by the FHWA, then that project or program is 
deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of § 4(f).214  For example, in 
determining whether a project qualifies for a nationwide permit, the FHWA will 
212 Federal Highway Administration Adopts Expedited Approval Process for Highway Projects Having 
"Minor Involvement" with Historic Sites, 6 Preservation Law Reporter Nos. 1 & 2, at 1002, 
(Spring/Summer 1987) citing 52 Fed. Reg. 31,111 (1987). 
213 See 33 U.S.C. § 404 (2004). This section of the Clean Water Act establishes requirements for the 
creation of a permitting program for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into waters of the United 
States.  For a general overview on the permitting process under the Clean Water Act see Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act: An Overview, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact10.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2004). 
214
 6 Preservation Law Reporter Nos. 1 & 2, at 1002.
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examine conditions that "relate to the type of project, the severity of impacts to § 4(f) 
property, the evaluation of alternatives, the establishment of a procedure for 
minimizing harm to the § 4(f) property and adequate coordination with appropriate 
entities."215  In effect, the FHWA will conduct a balancing test for the approval of a 
nationwide permit.
The FHWA has approved nationwide programmatic evaluations for projects 
in four major areas: "1. Independent Walkway and Bikeways Construction Projects; 
2. Historic Bridges; 3. Minor Involvements with Historic Sites; and 4. Minor 
Involvements with Parks, Recreation Areas and Waterfowl and Wildlife Refuges."216
The FHWA is quick to note that qualifying for one of the programmatic evaluations 
"does not relax the § 4(f) standards, i.e., it is just as difficult to justify using § 4(f) 
land with a programmatic § 4(f) evaluation as it is with an individual § 4(f) 
evaluation."217  Despite this declaration, these programmatic guidelines, at their 
inception, were controversial and viewed as a potential erosion of the protections 
afforded by § 4(f).218  However, this view is not universally held, with many in the 
transportation community viewing such guidelines as a responsible and efficient 
215
 4(f) Policy Paper,  supra note 44, at 10.
216
 Nationwide Section 4(f) Programmatic Evaluations, available at
http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/4fnspeval.htm. (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).
217
 4(f) Policy Paper,  supra note 44, at 10.
218 Id. “The National Trust for Historic Preservation opposed adoption of the expedited procedures, 
finding that they improperly redefined and diluted federal law, which had been enacted to ensure 
protection of historic and environmentally sensitive properties from ill-conceived federal actions.  The 
National Trust and six national environmental organizations submitted comments on December 18, 
1986, urging Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth H. Dole to reconsider approval of the guidelines.  
The organizations joining the National Trust included the Sierra Club, the National Parks and 
Conservation Association, the National Wildlife Federation, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, the National 
Association of Railroad Passengers, and the Environmental Policy Institute.”  Id.
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method for ensuring compliance with § 4(f).  And, since the guidelines specifically do 
not relax the scope or application of § 4(f), some may argue that § 4(f) is still too 
stringently interpreted and implemented.
D. Executive Order 13274 -- Environmental Stewardship and 
Transportation Infrastructure Project Reviews
Responding to pressure from the transportation community as well as 
recognizing a need to expedite the environmental review process, President George 
W. Bush issued Executive Order 13274 on September 18, 2002 aimed at streamlining 
the transportation project review process.219  This executive order directed agencies to 
"take appropriate actions… to promote environmental stewardship in the Nation's 
transportation system and expedite environmental reviews of high-priority 
transportation infrastructure projects."220  In addition, the order called on the 
Secretary of Transportation to "implement administrative, policy, and procedural 
mechanisms that enable each agency… to conduct environmental reviews [and]… to 
ensure completion of such reviews in a timely and environmentally responsible 
manner."221
The order also required the Secretary to "designate" a list of "high-priority 
transportation infrastructure projects that should receive expedited agency 
219
 Exec. Order No. 13274, 67 Fed. Reg. 184 (Sept. 23, 2002).  See also J.L. Laws, Bush Orders DOT 
to Streamline Environmental Reviews of Transportation Projects, E&E Daily (Sept. 19, 2002) 
available at http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/searcharchive/test_search-
display.cgi?q=transportation+streamlin.  
220
 Exec. Order 13274 § 1.
221 Id. at § 2(a).
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reviews,"222 and to establish a "Transportation Infrastructure Streamlining Task 
Force" to assist with streamlining efforts, review projects, and "identify and promote 
policies."223  It should be noted that the order made no substantive changes to § 4(f), 
but the order was clearly aimed at easing the review process within the confines of 
existing law.224  To that extent, its direct impact on § 4(f) is difficult to determine.  
However, like the legislative actions that are detailed below (particularly those 
occurring in the 107th and 108th Congresses), the executive order was important in 
framing the § 4(f) debate and in advancing the broader issue of the need for reforms 
of the environmental review processes.  The efforts directed by the executive order 
also proved to be successful according to the DOT.225  This success also helped build 
the case that environmental streamlining initiatives make sense and should be 
expanded, thus setting the stage for the transportation reauthorization process that is 
discussed in more detail below.226
222 Id. at § 2(c).
223 Id. at § 3.
224 See id.  The order repeatedly notes that actions taken with respect to the order be "in compliance 
with applicable law" or "consistent with available resources and applicable laws."  Id. at §§ 3 and 2(c).  
See also id. at § 6.  "This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Federal 
Government and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, 
instrumentalities or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person." Id.
225
 Amy Phillips, Officials Say Year-Old Effort to Streamline Transportation Projects Considered a 
Success, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 185, at A-11 (Sept. 24., 2003).  "[F]our of the thirteen 
projects designated for priority attention under the executive order now are moving forward."  Id.
226 Id.
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E. Bush Administration TEA-21 Reauthorization Proposal
The most recent Bush Administration response to § 4(f) came as part of its 
comprehensive legislative proposal to reauthorize TEA-21.227  The Administration's 
TEA-21 reauthorization proposal, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (known as SAFETEA), served as a starting point 
for the reauthorization debate.  It established broad transportation policy principles 
important to the Administration, as well as details on how to effectuate those 
policies.228  The House and Senate committees of jurisdiction received the 
Administration proposal and used it as a reference point during the drafting stages for 
their own TEA-21 reauthorization proposals.229
Indicating the importance that the Administration placed on § 4(f) reform, the 
SAFETEA proposal included a separate and specific section dedicated to § 4(f) 
reform.  It proposed, essentially an entirely new § 4(f):
SEC. 1604. "SECTION 4(f)" POLICY ON LANDS, WILDLIFE AND 
WATERFOWL REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES.
Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as 
follows:
"§ 303. Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites
"(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort 
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and 
public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and 
historic sites.
227
 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reauthorization/safetea_bill.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter 
President’s Bill].  See also supra footnote 11 for additional information on TEA-21 reauthorization.
228 Id.
229
 The Senate introduced the President’s TEA-21 reauthorization proposal as the Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, 108th Cong. (2003) on May 15, 
2003.  This bill became the vehicle for later Senate proceedings.  The House introduced the President’s 
proposal as the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 
2088, 108th Cong. (2003) on May 14, 2003.  This bill was later supplanted by H.R. 3550 which was to 
become the vehicle for the House’s consideration of TEA-21 reauthorization. 
54
"(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult, when 
appropriate, with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Agriculture, and with the States, in developing 
transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or 
enhance the natural beauty of lands crossed by transportation activities 
or facilities.
"(c)(1) The Secretary of Transportation may approve a transportation 
program or project requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public 
park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, 
State, or local significance, or land of a historic site of national, State, 
or local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local 
officials having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge or site) only if--
"(A) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that 
land, and
"(B) the program or project includes all possible planning to 
minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and 
waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.
"(2) In making approvals under this subsection, the Secretary shall 
apply the following standards:
"(A) The Secretary may eliminate an alternative as infeasible if 
the Secretary finds that the alternative cannot be implemented 
as a matter of sound engineering.
"(B) The Secretary shall consider the following when 
determining whether it would be prudent to avoid the use of 
land of a resource subject to preservation under this section:
"(i) The relative significance of the land of the resource 
being protected.
"(ii) The views of the official or officials with 
jurisdiction over the land.
"(iii) The relative severity of the adverse effects on the 
protected activities, attributes, or features that qualify a 
resource for protection.
"(iv) The ability to mitigate adverse effects.
"(v) The magnitude of the adverse effects that would 
result from the selection of an alternative that avoids 
the use of the land of the resource.
"(C) A mitigation measure or mitigation alternative under 
paragraph (c)(1)(B) of this section is possible if it is feasible 
and prudent.  In evaluating the feasibility and prudence of a 
mitigation measure or mitigation alternative under paragraph 
(c)(1)(B) of this section, the Secretary shall be governed by the 
standards of paragraphs (c)(2)(A) and (B) of this subsection.
"(d) The requirements of this section do not apply to--
"(1) a project for a park road, parkway, or refuge road under 
section 204 of title 23; or
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"(2) a highway project on land administered by an agency of 
the Federal government, when the purpose of the project is to 
serve or enhance the values for which the land would otherwise 
be protected under this section, as jointly determined by the 
Secretary of Transportation and the head of the appropriate 
Federal land managing agency.
"(e) The requirements of this section are deemed to be satisfied where 
the treatment of an historic site (other than a National Historic 
Landmark) has been agreed upon in accordance with Section 106 of 
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f).  The 
Secretary, in consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, shall develop administrative procedures to review the 
implementation of this subsection to ensure that the objectives of the 
National Historic Preservation Act are being met.
"(f)(1) The Secretary may approve a request by a State to provide 
funds made available under chapter 1 of title 23, United States Code, 
to a State historic preservation office, Tribal historic preservation 
office, or to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to provide 
the resources necessary to expedite the historic preservation review 
and consultation process under section 303 of title 49 and under 
section 470f of title 16, United States Code.
"(2) The Secretary shall encourage States to provide such funding to 
State historic preservation officers, Tribal historic preservation officers 
of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation where the investment 
of such funds will accelerate completion of a project or classes of 
projects or programs by reducing delays in historic preservation 
review and consultation.
"(3) Such requests under paragraph (1) shall be approved only for the 
additional amounts that the Secretary determines are necessary for a 
State historic preservation office, Tribal historic preservation office, or 
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to expedite the review 
and consultation process and only where the Secretary determines that 
such additional amounts will permit completion of the historic 
preservation process in less than the time customarily required for such 
process."230
The Administration's new § 4(f) proposal is notable in a number of respects.  
Although it does not do away with the "feasible and prudent" requirements that have 
been a part of § 4(f) since its inception, it does adopt a veritable balancing test similar 
230
 President’s Bill, supra note 227 at § 1604.
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to the approaches articulated in Eagle Foundation and its progeny.231  It also allows 
for § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act232 to be used in place of § 4(f) 
requirements for historic sites.  Finally, the Secretary is authorized to provide funds to 
state historic preservation agencies to speed up the completion of reviews.  The major 
thrust of these provisions is to provide flexibility to the Secretary and provide him or 
her with a menu of options to consider and use when evaluating a project under § 4(f) 
principles.
Draft explanatory report language accompanying the SAFETEA proposal also 
provides additional, key details on the Administration proposal.233  The explanatory 
language notes that the new § 4(f) language "would facilitate the [§ 4(f) evaluation] 
process by taking into consideration court decisions affecting the applicability of '§ 
4(f)' and codifying those factors that would more efficiently allow a prudent 
decision."234  As justification for making these proposed changes, the Administration 
notes that the current highway program has shifted away from new construction and 
development and toward "system preservation and modernization, in which existing 
facilities are the focus."235
The SAFETEA report also notes that "[t]he rigid rules for applying '§ 4(f)' 
spawned from the early court decisions [and] are often an awkward fit for the 
majority of situations faced today, where consequences to '§ 4(f)' properties are 
231 Compare Eagle Found., 813 F.2d 798.  See also SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12.
232
 National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. (2000).
233
 SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12, at 27
234 Id.
235 Id.
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usually not as extreme."236  The Administration also cited cases such as Eagle 
Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood as examples of "some later court decisions 
[that] injected greater flexibility in interpreting '§ 4(f).'"237  It also referred to other 
cases that have not been as flexible in their interpretation of § 4(f).238  These 
differences in approaches and interpretations among some of the circuit courts of 
appeal has caused a "disparity" that "has made it difficult to find a workable national 
standard to use in reaching determinations of whether an alternative is prudent and 
feasible."239  Therefore, according to SAFETEA, a reform of § 4(f) is needed "to 
establish more national uniformity, and [to be] consistent with the changed impacts of 
the highway program."240
V. EXPLORING RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
Against the backdrop of over forty years of judicial and administrative 
interpretation, actions during recent sessions of Congress have increasingly focused 
their attention to § 4(f), with many influential committee leaders calling for reform.241
The following discussion examines the recent legislative actions regarding § 4(f) with 
a specific emphasis on the developments that have occurred in 2003 and 2004 during 
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 28.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 See e.g., Brian Friel, Pave or Preserve?, Nat’l J. No. 50, at 3732-33 (Dec. 13, 2003).  Section 4(f) 
reform is supported by Senator Inhofe (R-OK), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee, and by Representative Don Young (R-AK), Chairman of the House Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee.  These  committees have primary jurisdiction over § 4(f).
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the protracted and continuing reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century (TEA-21).  As will be seen, the calls for reform of the § 4(f) 
requirements have been bipartisan.  Additional support for change has also come 
from many in the transportation community, while many in the environmental and 
preservation communities have lined up to oppose these reform efforts.242
A. H.R. 5455--ExPDITE ACT
During the 107th Congress, as the House and Senate began the initial TEA-21 
reauthorization process, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) of the House Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee launched one of the first dedicated efforts aimed at 
"streamlining" the environmental review processes that govern transportation 
projects.243  This effort included the introduction of legislation, the Expediting Project 
Delivery To Improve Transportation and the Environment Act (ExPDITE), aimed at 
streamlining highway and transit projects, as well as a hearing244 on issues and 
problems with the current environmental review processes for transportation projects.  
These actions helped lay the groundwork for later, more specific actions regarding § 
4(f) during TEA-21 reauthorization.
242 See e.g., id. at 3732-36.
243 See e.g., Expediting Project Delivery to Improve Transportation and the Environment (ExPDITE) 
Act, H.R. 5455, 107th Cong. (2002).
244 H.R. 5455: Expediting Project Delivery to Improve Transportation and the Environment Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the House Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (Oct. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/10-08-02memo.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) 
[hereinafter, ExPDITE Hearing].
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1. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Hearing
On October 8, 2002, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
held a hearing on Chairman Don Young's ExPDITE legislation.  The hearing was 
conducted as part of the process to reauthorize TEA-21.245  It included a variety of 
witnesses, representing a spectrum of interests, including the following: American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American 
Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA); American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA); American Highway Users Alliance; American 
Council of Engineering Companies; Tri-State Transportation Campaign; 
Environmental Defense; Defenders of Wildlife; Amalgamated Transit Union; and 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).246
From the witnesses presenting testimony, a strong endorsement for the 
ExPDITE bill and for reforming § 4(f) came from John Horsley, Executive Director 
of the AASHTO.247  In his prepared statement, he noted that AASHTO views "§ 4(f) 
as one of the greatest causes of delay" in the development and construction of 
transportation projects.248  He traced much of the problems with § 4(f) to the judicial 
interpretations that "have accumulated over the past 30 years as a result of dozens of 
court decisions," and he specifically singled out Overton Park as the source of much 
245 See Memorandum from Chairman Don Young to the Members of the Subcomm. on Highways and 
Transit, 1 (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/10-08-
02memo.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).  The memo notes that "[t]his hearing is the sixteenth in a 
series on the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century."  Id.
246 Id. at 3.
247
 ExPDITE Hearing (statement of John Horsley, Executive Director, Am. Assoc. of State Highway 
and Transp. Agencies)  available at http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/horsley.html at 
7 (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Horsley Statement].
248 Id.
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of the problems.249  According to Horsley, the "extraordinary magnitude" and "unique 
problems" test championed by Overton Park has "converted § 4(f) into an extremely 
rigid and unyielding statute, which often leads to absurd results--where minor § 4(f) 
properties are protected at great expense, with little lasting benefit to the community 
or the environment."250
As an example of the type of problems, costs and delays that a rigidly-
interpreted § 4(f) causes, Horsley cited a project in Kentucky that cost the state one 
million dollars in order to comply with the § 4(f) mandates.251  In the Kentucky 
example, the state was required to account and mitigate for an historic farmhouse in 
order to proceed with a road project that required the taking of the farmhouse 
property.252  In order to avoid the farmhouse, the state chose an alignment that 
required the taking of a modern house; both the farmhouse and the modern home 
were owned by the same person.253  The owner of the modern house used the money 
from the state compensation that was paid to him in order to take the modern house 
and used it to demolish the historic farmhouse and ultimately move the modern house 
to the site of the historic farmhouse.254  Thus, in the end, one of the sole purposes of 
§4(f)--preserving historic property--actually produced a result that destroyed historic 
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 8.
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property.255  This result, Horsley noted, is "not unique, [with] similar stories… 
repeated in every state across the country."256
In order to remedy these types of results, AASHTO argues that a legislative 
solution is needed.257  It would be "impossible for FHWA--even if wanted to--to 
override the case law through a rulemaking."258  The AASHTO position is that "only 
Congress has the power to get § 4(f) back on track and restore a degree of flexibility 
and common sense."259
Horsley articulated the AASHTO position on § 4(f) which "mirror[s] the 
elements of the ExPDITE bill."260  Four main elements comprise the suggestions for 
reform.261  They include the following: (1) allowing projects to qualify for a finding 
of no significant impact (FONSI)262; (2) "eliminat[ing] the concept of 'extraordinary 
magnitude' from the definition of prudence once and for all, and replace it with a 
more balanced and flexible definition;"263 (3) allowing the "substitution of Section 
106 consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act for § 4(f) compliance 
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 7.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 8.
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for historic properties;"264 and (4) permitting an "exemption of the Interstate Highway 
System from treatment as a historic resource."265
Representatives of the ARTBA266 and the APTA 267 echoed AASHTO's 
support for § 4(f) reform.  ARTBA's statement at the hearing concentrated on the 
delays that § 4(f) compliance causes to transportation projects.  In fact, according to a 
study cited by ARTBA, § 4(f) is "the most common reason" for project delays.268
Another reason that ARTBA mentioned regarding § 4(f)'s rigidity is the fact that it 
"predates most other federal environmental laws" and, thus has not had the historical 
precedent and perspective from which some other, later environmental statutes have 
benefited.269  APTA's statement also reiterated the positions of AASHTO and 
ARTBA.270
264 Id.  The requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act are very similar to 
those of § 4(f) and "if the Section 106 process results in a conclusion that satisfies the State Historic 
Preservation Officer, and the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation if the Council is 
involved, then § 4(f) should be satisfied as a matter of law."  Id.  As AASHTO notes, such approach 
"would provide an incentive for a more collaborative, problem-solving approach to historic resources, 
while reducing the potential for bureaucratic wrangling and litigation over § 4(f) findings." Id.
265
 Such an exemption is necessary, according to AASHTO, because there are efforts underway to treat 
the Interstate Highway System as historic property, and this outcome would make improvements to the 
system subject to § 4(f).  Id.  If this were to happen, the necessary § 4(f) reviews "could generate new 
paperwork burdens for every project on the Interstate system."  Id.
266 See ExPDITE Hearing (statement of Brian Holmes, Executive Director, Maryland Contractors 
Assoc. on behalf of the Am. Road and Transp. Builders Assoc.)  available at
http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/holmes.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter, 
Holmes Statement].
267 See ExPDITE Hearing (statement of William Millar, President, Am. Public Transp. Assoc.) 
available at http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/holmes.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) 
[hereinafter Millar Statement].
268
 Holmes Statement, supra note 265, at 4.  A study by the National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program found that § 4(f) requirements were cited most often (66 %) as the culprit behind 
transportation project delays.  
269 Id. at 8.
270
 Millar Statement, supra note 266, at 5.
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The pro-reform views, were, however, not the only views voiced during the 
hearing.  Representatives from the environmental community uttered their own 
positions and criticisms of the ExPDITE legislation.271  Speaking for the Defenders of 
Wildlife, William Snape, the organization's Vice President and Chief Counsel, took 
issue with the claims of AASHTO and others.272  He cited studies concluding that 
reasons other than environmental regulations were often the cause for project 
delays.273  Snape was also particularly concerned about §103 of the ExPDITE bill that 
proposed a number of changes to § 4(f) (see below for more detailed discussion on 
the bill's proposed changes).274  On behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), Deron Lovaas also presented testimony critical of proposals to reform § 
4(f).275  Like Snape, Lovaas offered information contrary to AASHTO's data 
regarding the causes of transportation project delays.276  On the issue of § 4(f) reform, 
he noted that the ExPDITE legislation "stacks the deck in favor of the Secretary of 
Transportation's preferred projects by re-defining "prudent" and "feasible," thus 
hampering a search for alternatives."277
271 See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 243.
272 See ExPDITE Hearing (statement of William Snape, Vice President and Chief Counsel, Defenders 
of Wildlife)  available at http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/snape.html (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2004).
273 Id. at 2.  One study cited by Snape indicated the top reasons for project delay were "lack of funding 
or low priority," "local controversy," or "the inherent complexity of the project."  Id.
274 Id. at 3-4.
275
 ExPDITE Hearing (statement of Deron Lovaas, Deputy Director of the Smart Growth and 
Transportation Program, Natural Resources Defense Council)  available at
http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/lovaas.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).
276 Id. at 2.
277 Id. at 3.
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2. Bill Language
Upon introduction of H.R. 5455, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) talked about 
his primary reasons for introducing the bill.  He observed that "[s]tudies have clearly 
outlined the problems associated with America's growing highway congestion crisis, 
which in 1999 alone, cost the nation $78 billion and led to the waste of 6.8 billion 
gallons of gas."278  The problems to which Chairman Young referred were project 
delays--delays that, he argues, creates "social, economic and environmental problems 
throughout our nation."279
To tackle the problem of project delays, H.R. 5455 proposes a number of 
revisions to environmental law that affect transportation projects.280  Specifically, in 
the area of § 4(f), the bill makes significant changes.  First--and perhaps most 
significantly--it replaces the current statutory § 4(f) framework with a more flexible 
and balanced approach.281  Section 103(c) of the bill rewrites the §4(f) requirements 
by mandating that "the Secretary shall not approve any transportation project… that 
has a significant impact on a protected resource."282  "Significance of impact" is to be 
determined by
comprehensively, taking into account (A) the value of the protected resource; 
(B) the value of the impacted land within the protected resource; (C) the 
nature and extent of the impact on the protected resource after mitigation, 
278
 U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Press Release on the Introduction of 
Environmental Streamlining Legislation (September 26, 2002) available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/press2…/release362.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).
279 Id. at 1.
280 See generally H.R. 5455.
281 See H.R. 5455 § 103.
282 Id. at § 103(c).
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measured both quantitatively and qualitatively and; (D) the views of the 
official with jurisdiction over the protected resource, and, in the case of 
private property, the views of the principal owner or owners of the property.283
This approach stands in sharp contrast to the Overton Park § 4(f) approach, as it 
specifically allows for a balancing of various issues and interests in making a 
determination as to whether a transportation project will impact a protected land.
The ExPDITE legislation also further attempts to streamline the approval of 
projects under § 4(f) by requiring the issuance of regulations "listing categories of 
projects that do not have the potential to cause significant impacts on protected
resources."284  This provision is similar to the nationwide programmatic evaluations 
described above285 except that it appears to expand the type of categories eligible for 
such streamlined consideration.  Again, the primary thrust of the ExPDITE legislation 
is to provide the Secretary with more flexibility and discretion to approve projects 
when considered against the totality of circumstances, and a categorical approval 
process furthers that goal.
This theme of flexibility also carries over to the provisions of ExPDITE that 
detail how project alternatives are to be evaluated.286  If the Secretary finds that a 
proposed project will have a significant impact on a protected property, then he or she 
is required to "develop and evaluate alternatives, as part of the alternatives analysis 
for the NEPA process, if any, for avoiding, minimizing, and mitigating the impacts of 
283 Id. at § 103(d)(2).
284 Id. at § 103(d)(3).
285 See supra Part IV.C.
286 Id. at § 103(e).
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the project."287  This provision helps ensure the proposed project moves forward in a 
timely manner by linking its review to the NEPA process, thereby reducing overlap 
and redundant evaluations.
The bill also sets forth standards to guide the Secretary in evaluating and 
selecting alternatives.288  Taking a cue from the current § 4(f) language, Section 
103(f) states the Secretary may approve a project if:
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative that would entirely avoid 
significant impacts on the protected resource; (2) there is no prudent and 
feasible alternative that would substantially reduce significant impacts on the 
protected resource when compared to the selected alternative; and (3) 
appropriate measures to minimize the harm to the protected resource have 
been incorporated into the selected alternative.289
The above language, however, differs significantly from current law.  First, an 
alternative must "entirely avoid" significant impacts.  Second, the "unique problems" 
standard is seemingly removed from the "prudent and feasible alternatives" 
consideration as the alternatives, now, need only "substantially reduce" impacts in 
order to be chosen.  And, third, the "all possible planning" requirement under the 
minimization of harms subsection of § 4(f) is replaced by a less strenuous 
requirement to take "appropriate measures" to minimize harm.290
In an apparent attempt to address the "problems" of Overton Park mentioned 
by AASHTO and others, the bill prescribes specific factors that must be assessed 
287 Id.
288 Id. at § 103(f).
289 Id. at § 103(f)(1-3).
290 Compare 49 U.S.C § 303(c)(2).
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when determining the feasibility and prudence of a particular alternative.291  An 
alternative is not "feasible" if the "alternative cannot be implemented as a matter of 
sound engineering."292  In addition, an alternative is deemed not "prudent" if "the 
Secretary finds that the drawbacks associated with that alternative clearly and 
substantially outweigh its benefits."293 The ExPDITE bill underscores the need for 
balancing by directing the Secretary to "assess the benefits and drawbacks of the 
alternative as a whole, taking into account the alternative's ability to achieve the 
project's objectives, the environmental and other impacts of the alternative (including 
the impacts on protected resources), the cost of the alternative, and any other factors 
deemed relevant by the Secretary."294 While the definition of "feasible" is clearly 
derived from Overton Park295, the definition of "prudent" draws heavily from the 
balancing discussion in Eagle Foundation.296  The drafters of ExPDITE have stitched 
together key elements from two cases that have offered differing interpretations on 
the scope of § 4(f) to produce a middle ground.  They have also given the Secretary 
additional discretion by allowing him or her to take into account factors as "relevant" 
in determining a project's prudence.297
291
 H.R. 5455 at § 103(g).
292 Id. at § 103(g)(1).
293 Id. at § 103(g)(2).
294 Id.
295 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.  For a project to be "feasible," it must be found by the Secretary 
to be so "as a matter of sound engineering."  Id.
296 See Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 804.  A review concerning a project's prudence, "calls for judgment, 
for balancing…"  Id.
297 See H.R. 5455 § 103(c)(2).
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Finally, ExPDITE proposes one additional change to the § 4(f) review 
process, while also keeping--with minor modification--a key provision of § 4(f).  In § 
103(h), the bill allows compliance with § 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act to be substituted for compliance with the other provisions of H.R. 5455 when the 
protected property at issue is an historic property.298  H.R. 5455, however, provides a 
key exception to the § 106 compliance substitution provision.  Sections 103(i-j) of 
H.R. 5455 state that "any direct physical impact" or "any visual, audible, or 
atmospheric impact" by the proposed project on a national historic landmark will be 
deemed "adverse" to the landmark and shall not be approved by the Secretary.299  The 
bill maintains the definition of protected properties (which it calls "protected 
resources") but with one minor modification.300  Under the bill, historic properties are
defined as those that are deemed historic under the National Historic Preservation 
Act301, as opposed to "historic site[s] of national, state, or local significance (as 
determined by the Federal, state, or local officials having jurisdiction over the… 
site)."302
Therefore, the bill, by not substantially changing the definition of protected 
properties maintains the overall policy established by Congress in 1966 of protecting 
valuable parklands, wildlife refuges and historic sites from encroachment by 
298 Id. at § 103(h).  For reviews involving historic properties, § 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act is deemed to be equivalent and/or redundant to a traditional § 4(f) review.  See e.g.,
Horsley Statement, supra note 221, at 8.
299
 H.R. 5455 § 103(i-j).
300 Id. at § 103(j)(3).
301 Id. at §103(j)(3)(B).
302
 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
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transportation projects.  However, under the bill, the Secretary is now given the 
flexibility and balance that Members of Congress sought when originally enacting § 
4(f).303  Ultimately, the 107th Congress came to an end without H.R. 5455 moving 
forward beyond the hearing stage, but the principles it outlined were to play an 
important role in the reauthorization of TEA-21 as will be seen below.
B. S. 3031 -- MEGA Act
During the 107th Congress, the Senate also joined the debate on environmental 
streamlining with the introduction of S. 3031, the Maximum Economic Growth for 
America Through Environmental Streamlining Act (MEGA).304  The bill's sponsor, 
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), during the introduction of the bill, discussed the goal 
of the bill: provide for environmental streamlining.305  Environmental streamlining is 
needed to "make the [environmental] permit and approval process work more 
smoothly and effectively"306  The bill was introduced in large part due to Senator 
Baucus' frustration with the DOT’s regulations that were promulgated as part of the 
requirements of TEA-21.307  As Senator Baucus noted, "[t]hose regulations308 were 
303 See supra Part II.B.2.
304 See Maximum Economic Growth for America Through Environmental Streamlining (MEGA) Act, 
S. 3031, 107th Cong. (2002).
305
 148 CONG. REC. S9850 (daily ed. October 2, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus concerning the 
introduction of the MEGA Act).
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 NEPA and Related Procedures for Transportation Decisionmaking, Protection of Public Parks, 
Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 
33960 (May 25, 2000).  The proposed rule was received with controversy and as a result was later 
withdrawn on September 20, 2002.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 59225 (Sept. 20, 2002).
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supposed to help the State DOT's get their jobs done better and more efficiently--not 
make their jobs harder."309  The proposed regulations required by TEA-21 received a 
number of comments--many of which were negative, according to Baucus.  
Ultimately, Baucus noted, DOT "went back to the drawing board and we never heard 
from them again" through two different Administrations.310
While MEGA focuses primarily on "streamlining" the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, it also addresses § 4(f) issues.311  Section 
2(a) of the bill authorizes state environmental reviews in lieu of DOT reviews to meet 
the requirements of various environmental laws, including § 4(f).  This provision, 
which is similar to the manner in which other environmental laws are administered 
(for example, the Clean Air Act)312, allows individual states to assume responsibility 
for conducting the review process for certain projects provided the state can capably 
carry out such review.313  The rationale behind this approach is that states will be able 
309
 148 CONG. REC. S9850.
310 Id.
311
 S. 3031 § 2(a).  See also 148 C ONG. REC. S9850.  Senator Baucus discusses the three main purposes 
of MEGA.  "First, the U.S. DOT needs to be the lead agency on at least two requirements, 'Purpose 
and Need' for a project and 'Scope of Alternatives.'  This will make sure that any stalemates are 
resolved quickly.  Second, we should allow States to take over the role of the U.S. DOT if they can 
meet certain requirements and if they choose to take on that role.  This will eliminate another step of 
bureaucracy.  Last, we must ensure that resource agencies act in a timely manner.  When it comes time 
for an agency like Fish and Wildlife to assess the extent of damage (if any) to a wetlands or the Army 
Corps of Engineers to issue a permit, these agencies shouldn't be able to take years to make these 
decisions."  Id.
312
 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000).
313
 S. 3031 § 2(a).
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to respond more nimbly to local needs and issues than the federal government, and 
can, therefore, more quickly move a project through the review process.314
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held a hearing on this 
bill and, as with the hearing on the House ExPDITE legislation, a variety of 
transportation groups were represented at the hearing.315  Again, the testimony on 
behalf of AASHTO was pivotal and supportive of § 4(f) reforms.316  AASHTO made 
it clear that § 4(f) reform must be addressed during TEA-21 reauthorization.317  "The 
core problem with § 4(f)," AASHTO noted, "is a lack of flexibility, balance, and 
common sense."  A stringently interpreted § 4(f) causes the DOT to be "in the 
position of protecting a minor historic property at the expense of other, more sensitive 
environmental resources or communities."318  Moreover, such strict interpretations 
"undermine not only the credibility of individual decision-makers or agencies, but of 
the NEPA process as a whole."319  In order to address these problems, AASHTO 
restated many of its positions that it articulated during the House ExPDITE hearing, 
314 See  148 CONG. REC. S9850.
315 See "Project Delivery and Environmental Stewardship": Progress on Environmental Streamlining 
Under TEA-21 available at http://epw.senate.gov/stm1_107.htm#09-19-02 (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).
316 See "Project Delivery and Environmental Stewardship": Progress on Environmental Streamlining 
Under TEA-21 (statement of Am. Assoc. of State Highway and Transp. Agencies) available at
http://epw.senate.gov/stm1_107.htm#09-19-02 (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter AASHTO 
Statement].
317 Id. at 14.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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namely that § 4(f) be amended to allow exemptions for "projects that have 'no 
significant impact' on § 4(f) lands."320
This hearing was important to advancing the concept of environmental 
streamlining.  It also signaled that the issue of § 4(f) reform was receiving bipartisan 
support.321  The bill and the hearing also helped set the stage for addressing the issue 
of § 4(f) reform in TEA-21 reauthorization--a legislative issue that was to rise to high 
prominence in the 108th Congress as will be seen next.
C. S. 1072 -- SAFETEA
The Senate, through the leadership of Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), 
Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, initiated the first 
serious congressional TEA-21 reauthorization efforts, with the introduction of S. 
1072, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 
2003 on May 15, 2003.322  This bill essentially served as a vehicle to introduce the 
Bush Administration's TEA-21 reauthorization proposal.323  However, the introduced 
bill did not address the more controversial § 4(f) issues that were included in the 
President’s SAFETEA version.324
320 Id.
321 See e.g., S. 3031.  This bill was introduced by a Democrat and co-sponsored by five Republicans.
322
 S. 1072. 
323 See generally, S. 1072.  See also Amy Phillips, Senate Reauthorization Draft Offers Limited 
Delegation, Sidesteps 4(f) Reforms, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 212, at A-17 (November
3, 2003).  See also supra Part IV.E.
324
 Phillips, supra note 323, at A-17.
73
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee marked up S. 1072 on 
November 12, 2003 and reported it from the committee with amendment.325  This 
committee-reported version, also was silent on specific § 4(f) reforms.326  The Senate 
finally addressed the § 4(f) issues when it considered the bill on the floor in early 
February 2004.327  Senator Voinovich (R-OH), a member of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, offered an amendment during the floor debate that specifically addressed the 
issue of § 4(f) reforms.328  Long a champion of § 4(f), Senator Voinovich offered this 
amendment as a compromise and the amendment was supported by the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation and the AASHTO.329
Senator Voinovich spoke at some length on his amendment, and he discussed 
the importance of reforming § 4(f).  His amendment allowed for a de minimis
exception to the provisions of § 4(f) for those transportation projects that have only 
minimal impacts on § 4(f) protected lands.  It also provided an "incentive for projects' 
sponsors to incorporate environmentally protective measures into a project from the 
325 See Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress--S.1072, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01072:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited July 15, 
2004).
326 See S. 1072. The committee reported bill contains a number of environmental streamlining 
provisions, but does not include either the Bush Administration's § 4(f) reform proposals or other § 4(f) 
proposals.
327 See 150 CONG. REC. S393 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2004).
328 See 150 CONG. REC. S643-45 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2004) (statement of Sen. Voinovich concerning his 
§ 4(f) amendment).  See also 150 CONG. REC. S671-72 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2004) (text of Senate 
Amendment 2271 offered by Senator Voinovich).
329 Id. at S643.
74
beginning" so that § 4(f) lands can be protected more efficiently.330  He 
acknowledged that these reforms are only a compromise and that "many groups 
would have preferred greater reform," presumably even Senator Voinovich 
himself.331
One of the primary reasons for offering the amendment was the need to 
harmonize disparate federal courts of appeals interpretations of § 4(f).332  Senator 
Voinovich noted that "inconsistent interpretation of the Overton criteria …[justifies] a 
more balanced interpretation of [§ 4(f)'s] requirements."333  Section 4(f), Senator 
Voinovich argued, has become "a lawyer's dream and a nightmare for the courts that 
have to interpret it and the States and U.S. Department of Transportation, which has 
to enforce the law."334  This situation has resulted in "needless confusion, significant 
delays, and high cost for issues that defy common sense."335
To help illustrate his case for reform, Senator Voinovich offered several 
examples of situations in which § 4(f) either failed in its purpose of protecting 
parklands, wildlife refuges, or historic properties or resulted in greater cost or delay 
for the project at issue.336  He cited a case in Ohio where—because of § 4(f) 
requirements—a highway had to be rerouted around a fifty-year old barn at a cost of 
330 Id. at S644.
331 Id.
332 Id. at S643.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. at S643-44.
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$100,000 and a delay of four months.337  The irony behind this particular case was 
that the “barn fell down due to owner neglect a few years later.”338  In another 
example in Pennsylvania, he noted that § 4(f) requirements caused the destruction of 
a non-historic farm in order to save an adjacent historic farm that, itself, was later 
developed.339  Senator Voinovich argued that his “amendment would at least have 
allowed the State preservation officer to make a balanced decision considering all of 
the information and alternatives,” and therefore could have likely prevented the 
outcomes in the above examples.340
Senator Voinovich’s amendment was ultimately incorporated into a larger 
“manager’s amendment” offered by Chairman Inhofe.341  The Senate adopted this 
amendment--Senate Amendment 2285--on February 12, 2004.342  Senate Amendment 
2285, incorporating Senator Voinovich’s amendment, made a number of changes to 
existing § 4(f) law and policy.  The text of Senate Amendment 2285 follows:
SEC. 1514. PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, WILDLIFE AND 
WATERFOWL REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES.
(a) PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITH DE MINIMIS IMPACTS--
(1) TITLE 23.--Section 138 of title 23, United States Code, is 
amended--
(A) in the first sentence, by striking "It is hereby" and 
inserting the following:
"(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.--It is"; and
337 Id. at S643.  Senator Voinovich noted that this case could be a harbinger of things to come because 
the age of the barn—fifty years—was the trigger for the § 4(f) review and ensuing mitigation efforts.  
He observed that “[s]oon, we won’t be able to do any improvements because sidewalks will be fifty 
years old in this country.”  Id.
338 Id.
339 Id. at S644.
340 Id.
341 See 150 CONG. REC. S812 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2004).
342 See S.1072 Status, supra note 325.
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(B) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS.--
"(1) REQUIREMENTS.
``(A) IN GENERAL.--The requirements of this section 
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an 
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary 
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a 
transportation program or project will have a de 
minimis impact on the area. 
``(B) CRITERIA.--In making any determination under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part 
of a transportation program or project any avoidance, 
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures 
that are required to be implemented as a condition of 
approval of the transportation program or project.
``(2) HISTORIC SITES.--With respect to historic sites, the 
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impact only if--
``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with 
the consultation process required under section 106 of 
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 
470f), that--
``(i) the transportation program or project will 
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or 
``(ii) there will be no historic properties affected 
by the transportation program or project; 
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written 
concurrence from the applicable State historic 
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation 
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and 
``(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in 
consultation with parties consulting as part of the 
process referred to in subparagraph (A). 
``(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND 
WATERFOWL REFUGES.--With respect to parks, recreation 
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may 
make a finding of de minimis impact only if--
``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and 
opportunity for public review and comment), that the 
transportation program or project will not adversely 
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park, 
recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible 
for protection under this section; and
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``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received 
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over the 
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.''.
(2) TITLE 49.--Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is 
amended--
(A) by striking ``(c) The Secretary'' and inserting the 
following: 
``(c) APPROVAL OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS.--Subject to subsection 
(d), the Secretary''; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
``(d) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS.--
``(1) REQUIREMENTS.--
``(A) IN GENERAL.--The requirements of this section 
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an 
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary 
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a 
transportation program or project will have a de 
minimis impact on the area.
``(B) CRITERIA .--In making any determination under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part 
of a transportation program or project any avoidance, 
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures 
that are required to be implemented as a condition of 
approval of the transportation program or project.
"(2) HISTORIC SITES.--With respect to historic sites, the 
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impacts only if--
"(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with 
the consultation process required under Section 106 of 
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 
470f), that--
``(i) the transportation program or project will 
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or 
``(ii) there will be no historic properties affected 
by the transportation program or project; 
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written 
concurrence from the applicable State historic 
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation 
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
``(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in 
consultation with parties consulting as part of the 
process referred to in subparagraph (A). 
``(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND 
WATERFOWL REFUGES.--With respect to parks, recreation 
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may 
make a finding of de minimis impact only if--
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``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and 
opportunity for public review and comment), that the 
transportation program or project will not adversely 
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park, 
recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible 
for protection under this section; and
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received 
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over the 
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.''. 
(b) CLARIFICATION OF EXISTING STANDARDS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall (in consultation with 
affected agencies and interested parties) promulgate regulations 
that clarify the factors to be considered and the standards to be 
applied in determining the prudence and feasibility of 
alternatives under section 138 of title 23 and section 303 of 
title 49, United States Code.
(2) REQUIREMENTS.--The regulations--
(A) shall clarify the application of the legal standards to 
a variety of different types of transportation programs 
and projects depending on the circumstances of each 
case; and
(B) may include, as appropriate, examples to facilitate 
clear and consistent interpretation by agency 
decisionmakers.
(c) IMPLEMENTATION STUDY.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary and the Transportation 
Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences shall 
jointly conduct a study on the implementation of this section 
and the amendments made by this section.
(2) COMPONENTS.--In conducting the study, the Secretary and 
the Transportation Research Board shall evaluate--
(A) the processes developed under this section and the 
amendments made by this section and the efficiencies 
that may result;
(B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact 
mitigation and avoidance commitments adopted as part
of projects conducted under this section and the 
amendments made by this section; and
(C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are 
considered de minimis under this section and the 
amendments made by this section, including 
information on the location, size, and cost of the 
projects.
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(3) REPORT REQUIREMENT.--The Secretary and the 
Transportation Research Board shall prepare--
(A) not earlier than the date that is 4 years after the date 
of enactment of this Act, a report on the results of the 
study conducted under this subsection; and
(B) not later than September 30, 2009, an update on the 
report required under subparagraph (A).
(4) REPORT RECIPIENTS.--The Secretary and the Transportation 
Research Board shall--
(A) submit the report and update required under 
paragraph (3) to--
(i) the appropriate committees of Congress;
(ii) the Secretary of the Interior; and
(iii) the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation; and
(B) make the report and update available to the 
public.343
While this amendment does not fully adopt the broad-reform minded 
principles espoused in the Bush Administration's § 4(f) proposal, it does make a 
number of significant changes to § 4(f).  It allows for a de minimis impacts exception 
for those projects that have only a minor effect on § 4(f) protected lands.344  And, in 
making this de minimis determination, the Secretary of Transportation is directed to 
consider "any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures" taken 
by the project.345  This provision does provide the Secretary with a measure of 
flexibility when reviewing and evaluating projects.  The DOT is also required to 
promulgate regulations "clarify[ing] the factors to be considered and the standards to 
be applied in determining the prudence and feasibility of alternatives."346  In addition, 
343
 S. 1072 § 1514.  This section incorporates the Senate Amendment 2285's changes and additions to 
the original version of S. 1072.
344
 S. 1072 § 1514(a).  
345
 S. 1072 § 1514(a)(1)(B).
346
 S. 1072 § 1514(b)
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subsection (c) of the amendment directs a joint study on the implementation of this 
section to be undertaken by DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the 
National Academy of Sciences.347
The ranking member of the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, Senator Jeffords (I-VT) spoke in support of the Voinovich § 4(f) 
amendment.  In summarizing the need for, and provisions of, the amendment, he 
noted the following:
An amendment to 4(f) is included in this legislation.  The objective of this 
amendment is to allow transportation projects and programs to move forward 
more quickly, while maintaining the protections of 4(f).  Those protections 
assure that there will be public notice and opportunity for public review and 
comment on proposed de minimis determinations for transportation projects, 
and that affected agencies will concur in the decision of the Secretary of 
Transportation that there will be no adverse impact on a historic site, 
recreation area, park, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.348
The amendment, Senator Jeffords argued, will also encourage front-end consideration 
of mitigation measures and other environmental planning initiatives.349  The 
provisions of the amendment, according to Senator Jeffords are "modest, common-
sense" and "assure the transportation planners will consider the location of important 
habitat, wetlands and other natural resources at the earliest stages of planning for new 
347
 S. 1072 § 1514(c).  This study is to be completed within four years after the date of enactment of 
the Act.  Id. at § 1514(c)(3)(A).  The study is required to include an evaluation of "(A) the processes 
developed under this section and the amendments made by this section and the efficiencies that may 
result; (B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact mitigation and avoidance commitments 
adopted as part of projects conducted under this section and the amendments made by this section; 
[and] (C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are considered de minimis under this section and 
the amendments made by this section, including information on the location, size, and cost of the 
projects."  Id. at § 1514(c)(2)(A-C).
348
 150 CONG. REC. S1265 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004).
349 Id.
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roads."350  The effect of such early planning will be cost-savings for states and local
departments of transportation, as well as better environmental protections.351  The 
Inhofe amendment, with the Voinovich § 4(f) language, was ultimately adopted by 
the Senate on February 12, 2004, and S. 1072 was also approved on the same day by 
a vote of 76-21, with three Senators not voting.352
D. H.R. 3350 -- TEA-LU
While the Senate proceeded with S. 1072 as its offering in the TEA-21 
reauthorization process, the House moved forward on a parallel track with the 
introduction of H.R. 3550, the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (TEA-
LU).353  Unlike the Senate approach in S. 1072 as amended, TEA-LU focuses only on 
historic sites and remains silent on other protected lands such as parklands and 
wildlife refuges.354  Section 6003 of TEA-LU states the following:
SEC. 6003.  POLICY ON HISTORIC SITES.
(a)  TITLE 49.--Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end the following:
"(d) SPECIAL RULES FOR HISTORIC SITES.--
"(1)  IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed 
to be satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic 
site has been agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the 
350 Id.
351 Id.  Senator Jeffords noted the following: "State and Federal agencies spend considerable time and 
money both protecting natural areas and building transportation infrastructure.  Unfortunately, 
conservation and growth efforts often happen independently and then come into conflict during the 
permitting and construction phases of a transportation project.  These investments need to be 
coordinated.  If conservation efforts are taken into account at the earliest stages of transportation 
planning, both priorities can be realized, in less time and at less cost."  Id.
352 Id.  Senators Kerry (D-MA), Edwards (D-NC) and Nelson (D-NE) did not vote.
353
 H.R. 3550.  The bill was introduced on November 20, 2003.
354
 H.R. 3550, § 6003.
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agreement includes a determination that the program or project 
will not have an adverse effect on the historic site.
`(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not 
apply in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation determines, concurrent with or prior to the 
conclusion of section 106 consultation, that allowing section 
106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this section 
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National 
Historic Preservation Act. The Council shall make such a 
determination if petitioned to do so by a section 106 consulting 
party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the views of 
the requesting party have been adequately considered and that 
section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic 
properties.
`(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following definitions 
apply:
`(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term `section 
106 consultation' means the consultation process 
required under section 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f).
`(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect' means 
altering, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics 
of a historic property that qualify the property for 
inclusion in the National Register in a manner that 
would diminish the integrity of the property's location, 
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or 
association.'.
(b) Title 23- Section 138 of title 23, United States Code is amended--
(1) by inserting `(a) POLICY- ' before `It is'; and
(2) by striking `In carrying' and inserting the following:
`(c) STUDIES- In carrying'; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) (as designated by 
paragraph (1)) the following:
`(b) SPECIAL RULES FOR HISTORIC SITES-
`(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed 
to be satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic 
site has been agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the 
agreement includes a determination that the program or project 
will not have an adverse effect on the historic site.
`(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not 
apply in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation determines, concurrent with or prior to the 
conclusion of section 106 consultation, that allowing section 
106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this section 
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National 
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Historic Preservation Act. The Council shall make such a 
determination if petitioned to do so by a section 106 consulting 
party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the views of 
the requesting party have been adequately considered and that 
section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic 
properties.
`(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following 
definitions apply:
`(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term 
`section 106 consultation' means the 
consultation process required under section 106 
of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 
U.S.C. 470f).
`(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect' 
means altering, directly or indirectly, any of the 
characteristics of a historic property that qualify 
the property for inclusion in the National 
Register in a manner that would diminish the 
integrity of the property's location, design, 
setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or 
association.'.355
The House provision, by focusing only on historic sites, does not provide the 
broader flexibility sought by the Bush Administration and the Senate.  Nevertheless, 
it does provide some "streamlining" to the § 4(f) program in terms of allowing 
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act to be deemed as also in 
compliance with the provisions of § 4(f) as they relate to historic sites.356  The House 
approved TEA-LU, with the § 4(f) amendment concerning historic sites, on April 2, 
2004 by a vote of 357-65.357
355
 150 CONG. REC. H1845, H1960 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2004).  The section was included in a substitute 
amendment offered during House floor consideration of the bill.
356 See H.R. 3550, § 6003.
357
 150 CONG. REC. H2121-22 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004).  
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E. TEA-21 Reauthorization Conference Committee Consideration
Although the actions by the Senate and the House earlier this year regarding § 
4(f) represented significant steps on the road to reform, the path ahead remains 
uncertain and not without potential obstacles.  The House and Senate completed floor 
consideration of their bills by April 2004, yet, to date, differences between their 
respective bills have not been resolved by the House-Senate conference committee.358
Although a number of non-controversial items have been addressed and resolved by 
the conference committee, debate over the bill's overall funding levels (an issue 
unrelated to § 4(f) reform) had caused the bill to remain stuck in the conference 
committee.359  Resolution on the funding issues is necessary before the conference 
committee is expected to tackle thornier issues such as environmental streamlining 
and § 4(f) reform.360  As Congress enters its summer recess period, prospects for 
resolving differences are unclear, with some commentators believing that it will be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to complete a bill before the November elections.361
VI. ARRIVING WHERE WE STARTED -- THE FUTURE OF § 4(f)
Given the current--stalled--status of the TEA-21 reauthorization effort, it is 
uncertain if § 4(f) reforms can be made in 2004.362  The TEA-21 reauthorization 
358
 Isaiah J. Poole, Another Roadblock for Transportation Conferees, Another Extension Clears, CQ 
Today, at 3 (July 23, 2004).
359 Id.
360 See e.g., Brian Stempeck, House Highway Offers Goes Nowhere Fast; No Deal Before Recess, 
Envtl. & Energy Daily, at 1 (July 23, 2004).
361 Id.
362 Id.
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process also represents the most likely legislative vehicle for making changes to § 
4(f), therefore, if this process is not completed during the 108th Congress, proponents 
for change will have to start the process anew in the 109th Congress.  In addition, 
with the possibility of political changes in the House, Senate and/or the White House, 
the final path of § 4(f) reforms could also change if the process drags out into next 
year.  
Indeed, the recent and current environment surrounding § 4(f) is unparalleled 
in the statute's history.  For the first time since its creation in 1966, a concerted 
legislative and political effort is underway to reform § 4(f).  How this effort evolves 
remains to be seen; however, the TEA-21 reauthorization process has forced, at the 
very least, a re-examination of a statute that has served as a key component of 
environmental and historic preservation law.  And, given the bipartisan support for at 
least some changes to § 4(f)363, it appears that change is in the future for § 4(f).
A. Possibilities for Change
With this backdrop in mind, it is useful to look at some of the possibilities for 
change that may exist for § 4(f).  Many of these proposed changes seek a return to the 
principles of flexibility and balance denoted in the conference report floor debate on 
the original § 4(f).  Among the many suggestions for reforming § 4(f), the following 
proposals have received the most attention:
363 See supra Part V.C.
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• adopting a de minimis exception for projects that have an insignificant impact 
on § 4(f) protected lands;364
• expanding the current nationwide permits approach;365
• allowing the Secretary to engage in a balancing test when determining 
whether or not a proposed project will use or affect a § 4(f) protected land;366
• ensuring that maintenance of existing facilities does not trigger § 4(f) 
protections;367
• allowing compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act to satisfy § 4(f); and368
• permitting the states to take a more active and up-front role in the enforcement 
and application of § 4(f).369
B. Going Back to the Future
As the discussion above has revealed, these proposals for change bubbled up 
over many years--often as a response to court cases and/or specific projects.  When 
analyzing the voluminous case law comprising § 4(f) jurisprudence, it is also useful to 
do so in the context of the original legislative history that accompanied the creation of 
§ 4(f).  Indeed, one of the best guides for determining what the future may hold is to 
364 See supra Part V.C.
365 See e.g., supra Part V.A. 
366 See e.g., supra Part IV.E.
367 See e.g., supra Part V.A.1.  See also supra Part IV.C. 
368 See e.g. supra Part V.C.
369 See e.g., supra Part V.B.
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look to the past.  To paraphrase T.S. Eliot, the result of exploration is often to arrive 
back from whence one came and to know it for the first time.  In this case, that means 
turning back to the legislative history of § 4(f), so that we can “know” § 4(f) for the 
first time.  Proponents for changing § 4(f) would be well-served to cite the statements 
made by Congressmen Kluczynski and Rostenkowski in 1966 during the debate of 
the DOT Act.  Although, these statements are obviously (and some would argue, 
merely) legislative history, they are nevertheless prescient and persuasive as to the 
need to have flexibility and balance in the § 4(f) program.  These statements also 
serve as the best evidence available as to how § 4(f) was viewed by those called upon 
to vote to approve or not approve it.
1. Restoring § 4(f)'s Legislative Roots
As discussed above, the legislative history concerning the original conference 
report that spawned the current § 4(f) is revealing.370  Referencing the committee and 
other debate that took place during the development of the original § 4(f) language, 
Congressman Rostenkowski observed that "[i]t was made clear at the time that as 
desirable as parkland preservation might be, other important factors must be 
considered."371  Congressman Rostenkowski could "easily forsee circumstances when 
it may be vital to use such [protected] lands."372  He offered specific examples, "[f]or 
instance, if it became necessary to choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or 
saving human lives by a highway improvement, I do not think any of us would have 
370 See supra Part II.B.2.
371
  112 CONG. REC. H26651 (daily ed. October 13, 1966) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
372 Id.
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any doubt as to which choice should be made.  Or if there were a choice between 
using public parkland or displacing hundreds of families, with the attendant burden 
imposed on them, I would want the Secretary to weigh his decision carefully, and not 
feel he was forced by the provision of the bill to disrupt the lives of hundreds of 
human beings."373
It is interesting to note that the statements of Congressmen Kluczynski and 
Rostenkowski are seldom cited or mentioned in the many cases and policy debates 
that have occurred since § 4(f)'s creation.  This fact is even more interesting 
considering these statements represent the only substantive comments made by 
Members of Congress during the legislative debate on the conference report for the 
DOT Act of 1966.  Surely, the current Congress and other policy and judicial 
decision-makers would benefit from a review of these statements.  Efforts to change, 
re-examine, or reform § 4(f) should start first with an analysis of the early history of 
the creation of § 4(f).
2. Mending the Judicial Split
Much has happened in the transportation and environmental law and policy 
arenas since § 4(f) arrived on the scene nearly forty years ago.  The case law 
interpreting the scope and application of § 4(f), over this time period, has not fully 
clarified the reach of § 4(f).  Rather, the true meaning of § 4(f) has been made murky 
by the differing approaches that certain courts of appeals have adopted.  In addition to 
reviewing the legislative history of § 4(f), it also is necessary to enact a clear 
statement on how § 4(f) should be interpreted, implemented and enforced.  A clear 
373 Id. at H26651-52.
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statement by Congress addressing the split among the circuits over the issue of how 
strictly § 4(f) should be interpreted would be of great benefit to all participants in the 
process--transportation planners and builders, environmentalists and historic 
preservationists.374  Providing a resolution to this judicial split could be found in § 
4(f)'s original legislative history--a history that suggests rigor but also balance and 
flexibility.375
The recent legislative efforts made by Senators Voinovich and Inhofe and 
Congressman Don Young and others reveal, perhaps, a possible new path for § 4(f).  
By allowing for flexibility in administering the § 4(f) process, this recent legislative 
approach might restore balance between the often competing, yet always intertwined, 
camps of the transportation planners and engineers and the environmentalists.  
Regardless of the outcome of the TEA-21 reauthorization process and whether or not 
it ultimately includes § 4(f) reform language along the lines of the recent Senate or 
House approaches, the issue of balancing these interests will not go away anytime 
soon.  After nearly forty years, the moment for change has arrived, and it is unlikely 
that those Senators, Members of Congress, associations and other interested parties 
and advocates for change will retire from the field without at least partial resolution 
as to how § 4(f) should be interpreted and applied.  The coming months will likely be 
the beginning of a new, more clarified, path for § 4(f) jurisprudence.
374 See e.g., Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3550 - Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy 
for Users (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/108-
2/hr3550sap-h.pdf.  (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).  "A clarification of the Section 4(f) definition of 
"prudent" is needed to forestall confusing standards applied unevenly by the Federal Courts of 
Appeals." Id. at 3.
375 See supra Part II.B.2.
